The Free Exercise of Discrimination: Religious Liberty, Civic Community and Women\u27s Equality by Stopler, Gila
William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law
Volume 10 | Issue 3 Article 3
The Free Exercise of Discrimination: Religious
Liberty, Civic Community and Women's Equality
Gila Stopler
Copyright c 2004 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl
Repository Citation
Gila Stopler, The Free Exercise of Discrimination: Religious Liberty, Civic Community and Women's
Equality, 10 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 459 (2004), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl/
vol10/iss3/3
THE FREE EXERCISE OF DISCRIMINATION: RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY, CMC COMMUNITY AND WOMEN'S EQUALITY
GILA STOPLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Liberalism, Religion and Women
The historical origin of liberalism can be traced to the debate
concerning the proper relationship between religion and the state.'
Two seemingly contradictory forces shaped liberalism's attitude
towards religion. On the one hand, the association of religion with
superstition, fanaticism, intolerance and reaction can explain the
liberal impulse to exclude religion from the public life.2 On the other
hand, religious toleration has always enjoyed primacy in liberal
theory in general and in American constitutional theory in
particular.' The appreciation of the importance of religion to its
followers along with the recognition of its divisive potential have led
liberalists to exclude religion from the public sphere, while at the
same time giving it a largely free hand in the private sphere." The
following discussion will show that from the perspective of women's
rights, relegating religion to the private sphere does not effectively
solve the inherent conflict between patriarchal religions and
women's rights or ensure women's right to equality in the
liberal state.5
* Hauser Research Scholar, JSD Candidate, New York University School of Law; LL.M.,
New York University School of Law, 2001; LL.B., Tel Aviv University, 1994. I am grateful to
David Richards, Nicola Lacey and Ratna Kapur for their useful comments.
I. JOHN RAWLS, PoLITIcAL LIBERALISM, xviii-xxvii (Columbia Univ. Press 1993)
[hereinafter PoLrIcAL LIBERAUSM).
2. Maimon Schwarzschild, Religion and Public Debate in a Liberal Society: Always Oil and
Water or Sometimes More Like Rum and Coca-Cola?, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 903, 903 (1993).
3. DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 67 (1986); POLITICAL
LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at xxvi.
4. Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality, Separation and Accomodation: Tensions in
America First Amendment Doctrine, in LAW AND RELIGION 63-64 (Rex J. Ahdar ed., 2000).
5. In talking about patriarchal religion I adopt Sylvia Walby's definition of patriarchy
as "a system of social structures and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit
women." SYLVIA WALBY, THEORIZING PATRIARCHY 20 (1990). This definition is particularly
useful as it serves to highlight patriarchal religions as social structures that subordinate
women and as generators and perpetuators of subordinating social practices. This definition
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On a more fundamental level, the separation between religion
and the state advocated by liberalism can be traced to the fact that
liberalism was founded on the rejection of the divine right of the
king to rule over his people. Liberalism replaced this notion with a
theory of political authority derived from the consent of the
governed as free, equal and rational persons.6 In his Two Treatises
of Government Locke rejected the divine right theory that the only
legitimate power in the world was the power God ordained to Adam
as the father of the species and from him to the kings as his direct
descendents and fathers of nations.' According to the divine right
theory, the divine right of the king over his people was identical to
the divine right of the father over his family, both stemming from
the Godly-ordained and limitless power of the father.8 While Locke
was adamant in his outright rejection of the divine right of the king,
he was much less determined in regard to the divine right of the
father over his family. In fact, although Locke rejected the idea that
the man had political power over his wife (i.e., the power of life and
death, which the feudal understanding of the divine right of the
father would seem to suggest), he nevertheless maintained that the
man had conjugal power over his wife, and that a woman was
subject to her husband by order of Gbd and in accordance with the
laws of nature.9 Furthermore, religious teachings served as a basis
for liberalism's exclusion of women from the public sphere and from
the political rights of bourgeois men as free, equal and rational
persons, and for the relegation of women to the domestic sphere in
which they were subjected to the divine rule of their husbands." It
was women's intellectual and moral inferiority, their irrationality
and their responsibility for the existence of sin in the world, as
taught by the church fathers, that justified excluding women from
the social contract."
We see that from its inception, liberalism, with its promise of
equality and freedom and separation between religion and the state,
held entirely different consequences for men and women. While men
gained the right to equality and freedom in the public sphere and
should not be understood as implying uniformity in the structures or practices of patriarchal
religions, but only in their goal of ensuring men's domination over women.
6. ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE RADICAL FUTURE OF LIBERAL FEMINISM 34 (1993) (citing
JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1960)(1698).
7. Id. at 37-38.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 41-42; see also CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 90-96 (1988).
10. EISENSTEIN, supra note 6, at 35-37.
11. Id. at 35-37.
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the right to practice their religion without hindrance in the private
sphere, women were completely excluded from the public sphere and
subjugated to men in the private sphere, at least in part on the basis
of religious teachings. The exclusion of women from the public
sphere on the basis of religious teachings continued long after the
political separation between religion and the state was established.
For example, notwithstanding the separation between religion and
the state enshrined in the American Constitution, the Supreme
Court of the United States employed the divine ordinance as late as
1873 to deny women the right to practice law, stating that "The
constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the
divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and
functions of womanhood."12
While today the U.S. Supreme Court would most likely refrain
from expressly basing its decisions on divine ordinance, this article
will show that despite the separation between religion and the state
that exists in the United States, women's right to equality is
curtailed by the discriminatory teachings and practices inherent in
patriarchal religions and cultures, and that this discrimination is
sanctioned, enforced and financed by the state.
B. Religion, Community and the State in the United States, Israel,
and CEDAW
This article explores how the relationship between religion and
the state in the U.S. affects women's rights and argues that direct
intervention aimed at changing religious and cultural practices that
discriminate against women is the only means of creating the
conditions necessary for the achievement of equality for women.
This article also compares the situation in the U.S. to that of Israel,
as well as to the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 13
Allegedly, the relationship that exists between religion and the
state could not be more dissimilar than it is between the United
States and Israel. The U.S. is considered a bastion of the secular
state, while the State of Israel, from its inception, makes religion
part of the law in areas such as family law, as well as part of
12. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872).
13. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Mar.
1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter CEDAW].
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politics, through the participation of religious parties in the political
process.' 4 The close ties between religion and the state in Israel
clearly violate women's right to equality. However, the American
separation between religion and the state is itself a barrier to
equality for women. Furthermore, recent developments in American
law and policy strengthen the ties between religion and the state,
and extend exemptions previously reserved for religious organizations
to other civil society organizations. These changes endanger the
equal rights achieved by women thus far and create a right to "free
exercise of discrimination" which seriously undermines women's
struggle for equality. 5 Thus, from the perspective of ensuring
women's equality, the American relationship between religion,
community, and the state is not much of an improvement over the
flawed Israeli system.
Articles 2 and 5 of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women, set out the proper
obligations of states with regard to the elimination of religious and
cultural practices that discriminate against women. Article 5(a) of
CEDAW states:
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures: (a) To modify
the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women,
with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of
the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women;1 6
Article 2 of CEDAW states that States Parties should "take all
appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish"
practices and customs that discriminate against women"7 and to
"eliminate discrimination against women by any person,
organization or enterprise." 8
The aforementioned articles of CEDAW instruct the States
Parties to actively intervene in people's social and cultural practices
in order to eliminate those practices that discriminate against
women. The articles do not specifically refer to religious practices,
but the reference in Article 5(a) to the elimination of "customary and
14. See infra Part Ill.
15. Id.
16. CEDAW, supra note 13, art. 5.
17. Id. art. 2(f).
18. Id. art. 2(e).
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all other practices" no doubt includes religiously based practices. 9
Further, Article 2(e) of the Convention specifically instructs the
States Parties to eliminate any discrimination by individuals and by
organizations, thereby imposing a duty on the state to fight
discrimination against women in the private and public spheres. In
fact, one of the major objections the U.S. has to signing the
Convention is that it may conflict with the constitutional right to
freedom of association.20
Measured against the standard set by CEDAW, it is easy to see
why a liberal regime of strict separation, which respects almost any
religious prejudice or practice, no matter how damaging it might be
to women, and which reveres freedom of association above all else,
would be found wanting. While the Convention has been largely
unsuccessful in combating religious and cultural practices that
discriminate against women, mainly due to its weak enforcement
mechanisms and the extensive use of reservations by States
Parties,21 the obligations it places on States Parties are, the only
possible means of creating the conditions necessary for the
achievement of equality for women.
C. Why is Separation Between Religion and the State Not Enough?
To the extent that most religions discriminate against women
it is generally assumed that confining religion to the private sphere
advances the rights of women by keeping the public sphere free
from repressive religious influences and subjecting it to the
principles of equality between the sexes. This assumption, however,
is too simplistic on several grounds. First, The exclusion of religion
from the public sphere in the United States is accompanied by
granting religious values an almost absolute supremacy over
women's rights in the private sphere. As one first amendment
scholar argues, giving religious people exemptions from generally
applicable laws is "merely the appropriate remedy for the damage
that precluding religious values from grounding law causes religious
people."22 The fact that religiously based discrimination against
19. Id. art. 5(a). Frances Raday, Culture, Religion, and Gender, 1 INTL. J. CoNsT. L. 663,
678-681 (2003).
20. Julie A. Minor, An Analysis of Structural Weaknesses in the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 137,
146 (1994).
21. Id. at 143-144.
22. Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L. J. 1611,
1613 (1993); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. Cm. L.
REV. 195, 222 (1992).
2004] 463
464 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 10:459
women continues unhindered in the private sphere has profound
effects on women's equality.
Second, the liberal assumption that relegating religion to the
private sphere will shield the public sphere and society as a whole
from the effects of malign religious teachings is gravely mistaken.
As McConnell reminds us, the great paradox of liberal government
is that it depends upon private institutions, such as religion, for the
formation of good citizens, and "[tihis makes liberalism peculiarly
vulnerable, because it is dependent on activities outside its
control."' The question, however, is why should we resign ourselves
to an interpretation of liberalism which leaves religiously based
discrimination against women outside its control?
Third, the assumption that a strict separation is maintained
between religion and the state is itself too simplistic. Today it is
perhaps more accurate than ever to say that the "wall of separation"
between religion and the state in the U.S. is crumbling.24 Women's
right to equality has been victimized by this breakdown. Thus, for
example, while strengthening the bond between religion and the
state in the U.S. has brought about an unprecedented flow of money
from the government to religious institutions,' it has not resulted
in an increased enforcement of women's rights to equality in
religious institutions.26 Consequently, more and more government
money is used to support religious institutions that overtly
discriminate against women.
D. The Combined Effect of Religion and Community on
Women's Equality
Today no discussion of the relationship between religion and
the state and its effects on women's equality can be complete
without a corollary discussion of the relationship between civic
community and the state and its effects on women's rights. In some
ways the relationship between religion and the state is a special
case of the relationship between community and the state.27 The
23. Michael W. McConnell, Why is Religious Liberty the "First Freedom"?, 21 CARDozo
L. REv. 1243, 1256 (2000) [hereinafter Why is Religious Liberty?].
24. See, e.g., Laura Athens, Is the Wall Between Church and State Crumbling?, 81 MIcH.
B. J. 18 (2002).
25. Marci A. Hamilton, Free? Exercise, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 823, 825 (2001).
26. See, e.g., id. at 874 (noting that religious organizations receiving government money
for the purpose of providing social services in charitable choice programs are exempt from
anti-discrimination laws).
27. The term community is a multifaceted and fuzzy term as recent debates between
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same distinction between public and private, which is a defining
feature of liberalism, and which is applicable to the relationship
between community and the state, is also applicable to the
relationship between religion and the state.
The private sphere, which contains both religion and
community, has been defined in a manner that ensures the existence
of an area of personal freedom which must not be violated and into
which public authority must not enter.2 Thus, many of the
protections given to religion can be explained as protections resulting
from a general right to privacy, and not as protections that are
unique to religion.29
Furthermore, it is often quite difficult to distinguish between
religious norms and practices, which give rise to questions of
religious freedom and establishment, and cultural norms and
practices, which do not give rise to such questions."0 For example,
while the demands raised by the leaders of the ultra-Orthodox
community in Israel to establish segregation between men and
women in some public services are rooted at least in part in
religious precepts, they are not a matter of religious freedom but of
cultural accommodation. The difficulty in drawing the lines between
religion and culture is not accidental. Religion is an important
aspect of many cultures, but in some cultures it is the defining
feature, which determines all aspects of culture."'
Traditionally, however, the protection accorded religious
institutions and religious beliefs against the state has been wider
liberals and communitarians on the meaning and importance of community, as well as
feminist interventions in these debates, can readily attest. See generally FEMINISM AND
CoMMUNriY (Penny A. Weiss & Marilyn Friedman eds., 1995); ELIZABETH FRAZER & NICOLA
LACEY, THE POLTrCS OF COMMUNITY A FEMINIST CRrrFQUE OF THE LiERAL-COMMUNrrARIAN
DEBATE (1993). I use the term community both in the larger sense, as civil society
(distinguishable from the state, from the market and from the family) and in the narrower
sense of distinct associations and groups, both religious and nonreligious, which law perceives
as communities. As will become clear in the following discussion, law's perception matters,
because it determines the boundaries of communities, enforces the power relations in them
and shapes the lives of their members. See Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 495 (2001).
28. FRAZER & LACEY, supra note 27, at 72-76.
29. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The
Constitutional Basis forProtectingReligious Conduct, 61 U. Cm. L. REV. 1245,1274-1277 (1994).
30. See, e.g., Gidon Sapir, Religion and State -A Fresh Theoretical Start, 75 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 579, 634-639 (1999)(discussing the Allegheny County case, Allegheny County v.
Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), in which the Justices of the Supreme Court
were divided on the question of whether a menorah and a Christmas tree were religious
symbols whose placement at the entrance to a government building constituted establishment
of religion or cultural symbols whose placement raises no constitutional problems).
31. See id. at 631 (arguing that religion is culture and that in some minority groups
religion is an all-encompassing culture which controls all aspects of life).
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than that given other communal institutions or practices. Thus, for
example, in the US, the legislation banning discrimination in public
accommodations or in employment, which has been applicable to
private institutions such as the Jaycees, has not been applicable to
religious institutions.32 Nevertheless, in recent years, some have
attempted to obliterate this distinction and have argued both that
all aspects of culture, community and civil society should be
protected from state interference on similar terms with religion,33
and that religion should be granted state support on similar terms
with other community institutions.34
Thus, in the current legal and political situation a discussion of
the relationship between religion and the state and its effects on
women's rights cannot be complete without an accompanying
discussion of the relationship between culture, community, civil
society and the state. These have become interrelated issues whose
combined effect on women's right to equality is devastating. For
these reasons this article will discuss simultaneously the
relationship between religion and the state and the relationship
between community and the state and will analyze their combined
effect on women's equality.
E. An Outline of the Article
Part II of this article will analyze the current legal situation
concerning the relationship between religion, community and the
state in the United States and discuss the ways in which this
relationship adversely affects women's right to equality. This article
will argue that the state is implicated in supporting and enforcing
religiously based discrimination against women through legislation,
judicial decisions, and even direct financing of such discrimination.
Furthermore, following the Supreme Court's decision in Boy Scouts
32. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 702 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1
(2000)) (exempting religious institutions from the duty not to discriminate on the basis of
religion); Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir.
1985) (holding that Title VII prohibitions on discriminatory hiring cannot be applied to a wide
range of positions within religious institutions); New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.
STAT. ANN. §10:5-5(West 2002Xprohibiting discrimination in public accommodations,
including schools, but exempting schools that are run by religious institutions).
33. This is the practical result of the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Boy Scouts of Am.
v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (see infra part II(E)); see also Michael W. McConnell, The Problem
of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 23 (2000) [hereinafter Singling Out Religion].
34. See, e.g., Sapir, supra note 30, at 632; Exec. Order No. 13,279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141
(Dec. 12, 2002) (Executive Order issued by President Bush in order to put a stop to what the
order terms discrimination on the basis of religion). See also infra part II(C), especially notes
78-84 and accompanying text.
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of America v. Dale,"5 the exemption from equality obligations has
been expanded to include all expressive associations, and a new
right to "free exercise of discrimination" has been formed. Thus, the
state has turned from a defender of equality into a champion of the
right to discriminate.
In Part III, this article will analyze the legal situation concerning
the relationship between religion and the state in Israel and its
effects on women's rights. By describing the situation in Israel, this
article supplies a context to the argument that despite the
perception that the American separation between religion and the
state is sufficient to guarantee women's right to equality, in many
respects such separation helps perpetuate women's inequality in
much the same way as the clearly flawed Israeli regime of partial
integration, and is therefore a similar violation of women's rights.
In Part IV, this article will argue that the American and Israeli
models of the relationship between religion and the state are both
flawed because they are both motivated by similar concerns. At the
root of the problem lies the fact that both the Israeli model of partial
integration between religion and the state and the United States'
model of separation between religion and the state are models that
are aimed at shielding religion from equality obligations ("Shielding
Models"), as opposed to a model of state intervention in religion,
such as that suggested by CEDAW, which is aimed at enhancing
women's equality and restricting the negative impact religion can
have on democracy and individual rights ("Equality Enhancing
Model"). Likewise, the recent shielding of expressive associations
from equality obligations is also at odds with the Equality Enhancing
Model suggested by CEDAW, and widely expands the right to free
exercise of discrimination.
This article will claim that these wide exemptions from equality
norms are unconstitutional considering the importance of equality
in the constitutional scheme in general and in recent First
Amendment jurisprudence in particular. Therefore the exemption
from equality norms in the context of both religious and nonreligious
associations should be strictly restricted to situations of intimate
association. Thus, while an organized church maintaining a policy
of discrimination against women in ministerial positions will
be violating anti-discrimination law, a small congregation directly
selecting a pastor with whom they will have intimate interaction will
be allowed to consider the person's sex or race in the selection process.
In Part V, this article will turn to refuting the assumptions
35. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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underlying the expanding right to free exercise of discrimination
granted to both religious and non religious communities. The
reigning liberal justification for exempting communities from
equality obligations is based on two premises." The first premise is
that the convictions, traditions, attachments and loyalties that
people hold in their private lives and which shape the communities
in which they live are often so fundamental and enduring that the
state has no right to intervene in the life of communities in order to
try to change them by enforcing equality obligations. The second
premise is that the problem of subjecting vulnerable members of the
community to discrimination and oppression is solved by the fact
that such members have the option to exit the community. If
community members remain in the community despite the
discrimination against them it is assumed that they embrace the
discrimination and freely choose it. This article will argue that this
justification is fraught with internal contradictions. If it is through
membership in communities and associations that one forms the
most enduring, important and immutable attachments and
commitments, there is no discernable basis for assuming that
weaker members of the community can simply walk away from their
community and leave their oppression behind. Not only are the
weaker members as attached to the community as any other
member, but their ability to exit the community is further impaired
by the discrimination against them. Moreover, if the discrimination
and the disempowerment experienced by weaker members of the
community hampers their abilities to exit it, we cannot say that
they freely choose the oppression into which they were most often
born and socialized.
Analyzing the effects of oppression on the autonomy and agency
of women, this article will argue that affording communities the
right to free exercise of discrimination is incompatible with the
equality obligations that a liberal democratic state has towards it
citizens and that the right to free exercise of discrimination
undermines the democratic process, which is premised on the free
and equal participation of all citizens. Lastly, this article will
discuss the education of girls in traditional communities and argue
that in the case of children, there is no choice or ability to exit the
community, and therefore, the state has a duty to intervene in order
to ensure that all schools teach sex equality. This article will
conclude by reiterating that women's right to equality can only be
realized by heeding CEDAW's call to intervene in the private sphere
36. See infra Part V(A), especially notes 321-330 and accompanying text.
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in order to change discriminatory beliefs and practices.
II. THE LEGAL SITUATION IN THE US - FROM SEPARATION TO
NEUTRALITY, FROM RELIGION TO COMMUNITY
A. Introduction
The US constitution is generally understood to preclude the
imposition of norms ensuring equality for women on religious
entities, due to the sanctity of the freedoms guaranteed by the First
Amendment.37 This understanding has not changed over the years
even as the ties between religion and the state have become much
closer, and the protection granted the free exercise of religion has
narrowed.3" The classical paradigm of separation between religion
and the state has been largely replaced by an understanding of
religion as an indispensable part of both private and public life and
a paradigm of state neutrality towards religion.39 Though the shift
to state neutrality towards religion should have been conducive to
the enforcement of anti-discrimination laws on religious institutions,
such enforcement is today even less likely than it was in the era of
strict separation.' At the same time, government funds that were
once given only to non-religious institutions are now granted to
religious institutions as well.4 Thus, the combined result of the
reluctance to interfere with religious beliefs on the one hand and the
push for neutrality towards religion on the other is the further
legitimization of religiously motivated discrimination against
37. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Wendorff, Employment Discrimination and Clergywomen:
Where the Law Has Feared to Tread, 3 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 135, 136 (1993); Cass
R. Sunstein, Should Sex Equality Law Apply to Religious Institutions, in SUSAN MOLLER OKIN,
Is MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN 85, 86 (1999).
38. See infra Parts II(C), II(D).
39. Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our
Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 70-71(2002)[hereinafter The Distinctive Place].Under
the neutrality model the state is required to treat religious institutions similarly to all other
institutions. Thus, this model entails neutrality between religion and nonreligion and not
merely neutrality between the different religions.
40. Thus, courts have refused to apply the Smith holding, which rejected religious belief
as a basis for exemption from generally applicable laws, to discrimination against women in
religious institutions. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
see also infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
41. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S 639 (2002Xfinding an Ohio program that
provided tuition aid to students whose parents chose for them to attend private school did not
offend the Establishment Clause).
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women and the use of government money to support it.
42
Furthermore, the same exemptions from anti- discrimination law
that were once given only to religious institutions can now be
granted to an almost unlimited list of other private institutions that
fall under the extremely flexible definition of an "expressive
association",4 and some even suggest expanding these exemptions
to all private associations."' Thus, a new right that can be termed
the right to "free exercise of discrimination" has been created. The
contours of this right are as follows: it is a right granted to
communities and to associations and consequently to their
individual members, to discriminate against both members and
nonmembers of the community or association in almost all matters
concerning the internal life of the community or association
including membership, employment, equal participation, etc.45 The
right to free exercise of discrimination is the same right that
mainstream powerful organizations such as the Boy Scouts demand
when they refuse to accept homosexuals as scoutmasters,4 the right
that mainstream powerful religions such as Southern Baptists or
the Catholic Church assert when they refuse to ordain women, and
the right that minority cultures such as Santa Clara Indians seek
when they refuse to let children of women who married out of the
tribe become members of the tribe by invoking their right to
culture.47
B. The Separation Model
Two competing models for the proper relationship between
religion and the state exist in First Amendment scholarship: the
separation model and the neutrality model." The separation model
seeks to erect a "wall of separation" between religion and the state.49
Under this model, religion must be kept out of the public sphere and
the government may not establish any religion, either by giving
42. For example, the Ohio vouchers program that was affirmed by the Supreme Court in
Zelman requires schools accepting the vouchers not to discriminate on the basis of race,
national origin or religion in admission, but does not require them not to discriminate on the
basis of sex. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
43. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale 530 U.S. 640, 641 (2000).
44. Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Perils of Moderation: The Case of the Boy
Scouts, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 119, 120 (2000).
45. Id.
46. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. 659.
47. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
48. The Distinctive Place, supra note 39, at 50.
49. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. ,330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947Xquoting Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
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state power to religious institutions or by financing religion in any
way.50 At the same time, the government is prohibited from
intervening in matters of religious entities, including matters such
as discriminatory hiring and firing of ministers.5 Relying on the
separation model, the Supreme Court has forbidden financial aid to
religious schools5" and has refused to apply anti- discrimination
laws to employment relationships in religious institutions. 3
Thus, in McClure v. Salvation Army the Fifth Circuit held that
the Free Exercise Clause precluded the court's intervention in a suit
filed by an ordained minister of The Salvation Army, who alleged
that she received a lower salary and fewer benefits than her male
counterparts and was fired after she complained to the EEOC. 4 The
Salvation Army did not claim and the court did not hold that the
discrimination against McClure was based on religious precepts.55
Further, despite the fact that it seems highly unlikely that the
discrimination in salary and benefits against women clergy was
religiously based, the Salvation Army was not required to offer any
reasons for the alleged discrimination because the court held that
the First Amendment prohibits any state involvement in
ecclesiastical matters such as the relationship between a church and
its ministers.56 The court's decision was not based on the integrity
of the religious message of The Salvation Army, nor was it based on
the deeply held religious beliefs of the members of the church.57
Even had McClure supplied evidence that most of the members of
The Salvation Army were religiously opposed to discrimination
against their women clergy in salary and benefits the court would
not have intervened.
The McClure decision is but an example of how the separation
model itself can be used as a shield for injustice. What the McClure
court defended in its decision was merely the right of the existing
leadership of the church to make decisions and take actions with
50. The Distinctive Place, supra note 39, at 53-57.
51. Id. at 62-63.
52. See, e. g., Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756 (1973); Aguilar v. Felton 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
53. See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 896 (1972); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986); E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455
(D.C. Cir. 1996).
54. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F. 2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
896 (1972).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 560.
57. Id. At 559-61 (finding that Title VII was not intended to regulate employment matters
between a church and its ministers).
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impunity, even when such actions involved otherwise unlawful
discrimination, regardless of whether these actions were religiously
motivated, or whether they were compatible with the wishes of the
members of the church. As Justice Rehnquist observed in his
dissent in Serbian Diocese", government non-intervention in
ecclesiastical decisions subjects individual members of religious
associations to domination by religious authorities.59 "If the civil
courts are to be bound by any sheet of parchment bearing the
ecclesiastical seal and purporting to be a decree of a church court,
they can easily be converted into handmaidens of arbitrary
lawlessness.' Ironically, as will be discussed below, twenty-four
years after this perceptive warning, Chief Justice Rehnquist joined
the majority of the court in extending the principle of government
non-intervention in ecclesiastical decisions to government non-
intervention in decisions of all expressive associations,6' thus
subjecting members of all expressive associations to domination by
oppressive association leaders and completing the conversion of the
civil courts into "handmaidens of arbitrary lawlessness."
C. The Neutrality Model
Under the neutrality model, religious institutions are no
different than any other institution and should be treated similarly
to all other institutions by the state.62 The neutrality model has
gained support in recent years.63 This trend has culminated in a
recent Supreme Court decision holding that the Ohio school
vouchers program that allows parents to use state financial aid in
order to send their children to private religious schools did not
violate the Establishment Clause." The Court held that because the
Ohio program is neutral with respect to religion and provides
benefits to individuals who are free to choose whether to use them
in religious or in secular schools, the program does not offend the
Constitution.' The practical result of this holding is that there is no
58. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America and Canada v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 725-35 (1976).
59. NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM
IN AMERICA 82 (1998).
60. Serbian Diocese, 426 U.S. 727.
61. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640(2000).
62. The Distinctive Place, supra note 39, at 66.
63. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman's Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and
the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 917,918 (2003) [hereinafter
Zelman's Future].
64. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
65. Id. at 662.
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longer any limitation on the use of government money for religious
education as long as the money is transferred from the government
to the religious school through the private hands of the child's
parent. Most importantly, in its decision, the Supreme Court did not
hold that in order to be constitutional, voucher programs must
include provisions prohibiting participating schools from
discrimination. The Ohio program at issue in Zelman includes a
provision prohibiting discrimination in admissions on the basis of
race, religion or ethnic background,' as well as a provision
prohibiting participating schools from teaching "hatred of any
person or group on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or
religion." 7 However, the program does not prohibit discrimination
in admissions on the basis of sex, nor does it prohibit the schools
from teaching students that women are inferior to men or that their
opportunities in life should be restricted according to their sex. The
result is that government money can be used to educate girls and
boys that women are unequal to men.
Another important area in which the neutrality model has
prevailed is the provision of social services, or what has come to be
known as charitable choice or faith-based initiatives. The purpose
of charitable choice legislation is to allow the government to enter
into contract with religious organizations for the provision of social
services on an equal basis with nonreligious organizations, while at
the same time exempting the religious organizations from at least
some of the antidiscrimination obligations usually attached to the
use of government money." The Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunities Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) was the first
act to include such provisions.6 9 After attempts to pass federal
legislation extending the charitable choice requirement to all
federally funded welfare programs faltered,7" President Bush has
signed an Executive Order entitled Equal Protection of the Laws for
Faith-Based and Community Organizations that allows government
agencies to give federal financial assistance to faith-based
organizations carrying out social services programs such as child
care, elderly care, job training, counseling and rehabilitation
66. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(AX4).
67. Id. sec. 3313.976(A)(6).
68. Laura B. Mutterperl, Employment at (God's) Will: The Constitutionality of
Antidiscrimination Exemptions in Charitable Choice Legislation, 37 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
389, 391 (2002).
69. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, §§ 2161-63 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
604a (2000).
70. See, e.g., Mutterperl, supra note 68, at 418-419.
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services.7 The stated objective of the Order is to allow faith-based
organizations to compete on an equal footing for federal financial
assistance and to stop the discrimination on the basis of religion and
religious belief in the distribution of federal financial assistance.72
The Order forbids the use of the money for inherently religious
activities, such as worship, religious instruction, or prostelytization,
but allows the religious organizations to continue to carry out their
religious mission parallel to their use of federal money.73 Religious
organizations may use their facilities to provide social services
supported by government funds without removing religious symbols
from the facilities or religious terms from their names, and may
select their board members on a religious basis.74 Contrary to the
neutrality model, however, Section 4 of the Executive Order amends
Executive Order 11,246 to allow religious organizations that receive
federal funds to discriminate on the basis of religion in their
employment decisions, although such discrimination is forbidden in
nonreligious institutions.75
In her seminal article, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the
Bill of Rights, Mary Becker observes that there has never been a
real separation between religion and the state in the U.S., nor has
there been government neutrality towards religion. 6 Instead,
government has always advanced religion by granting it substantial
subsidies in the form of exemptions from income and property taxes
and awards of government contracts.77 Indeed, Justice O'Connor's
detailed survey in Zelman v. Harris of the amount of funds that
federal, state, and local governments provide to religious
institutions reveals that a staggering amount of public money,
estimated in the billions of dollars each year, reaches religious
institutions either in the form of tax exemptions or as payment for
services. 7' As Becker rightly points out, by subsidizing religion and
by increasing its power through the grant of government contracts,
the government magnifies the subordinating effects of religion on
women. v9 This observation is more true today than ever before.
Charitable choice and school voucher programs enable patriarchal
71. Exec. Order No. 13,279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141 (Dec. 16, 2002).
72. Id. at 77,142, §§ 2(b), 2(c).
73. Id. at 77,142-43, § 2(f).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 77,143-44, § 4.
76. Mary Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of"Rights" A Bicentennial
Perspective, 59 U. Clu. L. REv. 453,479-86 (1992) [hereinafter The Politics of Women's Wrongs].
77. Id.
78. 536 U.S. 639, 663-68 (2002).
79. The Politics of Women's Wrongs, supra note 76, at 484.
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religions to further enhance their power and to spread their
subordinating teachings concerning women's proper role to an ever-
increasing audience. Moreover, by supplying patriarchal religion
with government funds, the government implicitly, if not explicitly,
sanctions such teachings, especially by supporting programs that
use the religious view about women's and men's roles as a remedial
tool and by funding religious schools that teach the subordination
of women.
D. The Smith Decision
With regard to the Free Exercise Clause the Court has
embraced the neutrality model as used in Employment Division v.
Smith.s" In this case, the respondents were fired because they
ingested peyote "for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of their
Native American Church."s ' The State of Oregon denied them
unemployment compensation "under a state law disqualifying
employees discharged for work-related "misconduct"' 2 . The court
held that a state law prohibiting the ingestion of peyote is not in
violation of the Free Exercise Clause so long as it is a neutral,
generally applicable law that is not specifically directed to the
religious practice and that is constitutional as applied to those who
ingest peyote for nonreligious reasons. According to the Court, an
individual's religious beliefs cannot "excuse him from compliance
with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the state is
free to regulate."'
After the Smith decision, the widely held view among scholars
was that the decision was a disaster for religious liberty,8 and that
it would allow the government to ban almost any kind of religiously
motivated activity.' However, many scholars have argued that even
before Smith the Supreme Court rarely upheld requests for religious
exemptions from facially neutral laws, even though it consistently
held that the government must have a compelling interest for
denying such exemptions.' One explanation suggested for the
80. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id at 879.
84. James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1409 (1992).
85. Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of the Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 BYU L. REv. 117, 118.
86. Eisgruber and Sager, supra note 29, at 1246-48; Sullivan, supra note 22, at 215-16;
Michael McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CH. L. REV.
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discrepancy between the Court's rhetoric and its decisions was the
fact that requests for exemptions from neutral laws almost
invariably come from members of minority religions, while
mainstream religions are already nurtured by the legislature and
do not need exemptions."s Despite the Court's ambivalent attitude
towards religious exemptions in pre-Smith holdings and its clear
rejection of religious belief as a basis for an exemption from a
generally applicable law in Smith, the courts, both before and after
Smith, refused to intervene in cases where religious institutions
have discriminated against female employees in contravention of
generally applicable anti- discrimination laws. Thus, in a post-
Smith decision, E.E.O.C. v. Catholic University of America, the D.C.
Circuit Court specifically rejected the application of Smith's
neutrality principle to a claim by a Catholic University professor
who claimed that she was denied tenure due to sex discrimination."
The court's reasoning, which was not supported in any way by the
Smith holding itself, was that the Smith principle applied to
religious individuals but not to religious institutions, and thus the
latter might still be exempt from otherwise applicable neutral laws
such as the anti-discrimination laws. 9
E. Expressive Associations or the Courts as "Handmaidens of
Arbitrary Lawlessness'0
While the question of the applicability of anti-discrimination
laws to religious institutions has yet to come before the Supreme
Court, it seems safe to say that in light of its recent decision in Boy
Scouts, 1 the Supreme Court will embrace the position that religious
institutions should be exempt from anti-discrimination laws. This
position is in fact subsumed in the Boy Scouts holding which seems
to create a wholesale exemption for all expressive associations from
the reach of anti-discrimination laws.
In Boy Scouts, a homosexual assistant scoutmaster brought
action against the Boy Scouts of America under New Jersey's public
accommodations law, which prohibits, inter alia, discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation in public accommodations. The
1109, 1110 (1990) (McConnell points out, however, that the compelling interest doctrine was
applied much more rigorously in the state and lower federal courts, and that legislatures and
executive bodies frequently conformed their decisions to its dictates).
87. Sullivan, supra note 22, at 216.
88. 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
89. Id. at 462.
90. Serbian Diocese 426 U.S. 696, 727 (1976).
91. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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organization had revoked his position upon learning that he was a
homosexual. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the Boy
Scouts' revocation of Dale's position violated the state's public
accommodations law, and that the law did not violate the Boy
Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association and was
properly designed to achieve the compelling state interest of
eliminating discrimination.92 The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the state interest in eliminating discrimination did not justify
the restriction on the Boy Scouts' right to expressive association.93
The Court held that a group's First Amendment right to
expressive association would trump anti- discrimination laws under
certain conditions. First, "a group must engage in some form of
expression, whether it be public or private. 4 The inquiry whether
an organization engages in some form of expression is a factual one
and the Court found that the Boy Scouts met this condition as an
association that seeks to transmit a system of values.95 Second, the
Court stated that the forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a
group infringes on the group's freedom of expressive association if
the presence of that person affects the group's ability to advocate
public or private viewpoints in a significant way." The Court
specifically rejected the possibility of a factual inquiry in order to
determine the group's viewpoint and held that it must accept the
group's assertion with regard to the nature of its expression.97 Thus,
if the Boy Scouts assert that they teach that homosexual conduct is
wrong, the Court must accept this assertion as true. Furthermore,
the Court rejected the possibility of a factual inquiry into the
question of what would impair the group's expression and concluded
that it must give deference to the group's view on this matter as
well.9" Relying on the Boy Scout's assertions, the Court concluded
that Dale's presence would significantly affect the Boy Scout's
expression.99 The Court went on to say,
We have already concluded that a state requirement that the
Boy Scouts retain Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would
significantly burden the organization's right to oppose or
disfavor homosexual conduct. The state interests embodied in
92. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am. 734 A.2d 1196 (2d Cir. 1999).
93. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 659.
94. Id. at 648.
95. Id. at 650.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 652.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 655-56.
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New Jersey's public accommodations law do not justify such a
severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts' rights to freedom of
expressive association. That being the case, we hold that the
First Amendment prohibits the State from imposing such a
requirement through the application of its public
accommodations law. i' °
In its decision, the Boy Scouts court purported to rely on its
decision in Roberts v. Jaycees."°1 In the Roberts case, the Court held
that the United States Jaycees' exclusion of women from
membership was a violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act
that forbade discrimination in public accommodations. The Roberts
court held that States have a compelling interest in eliminating
discrimination against women in public accommodations. °2 It also
held that the enforcement of the anti-discrimination law in that
particular case would not materially interfere with the ideas that
the Jaycees sought to express." The Boy Scouts court relied on the
latter part of the Roberts' court holding in order to claim that
whenever an antidiscrimination law materially interfered with an
organization's expression, it would be unconstitutional to apply it to
the organization.0 4 The unprecedented result of this holding,
although not required by Roberts, is that no matter how compelling,
the need to eliminate discrimination can never justify a substantial
intrusion into a group's right to expressive association 05
The Court in Boy Scouts took the decision as to the materiality
of the interference in the organization's expression out of the hands
of the court and placed it into the hands of the organization itself.
Boy Scouts explicitly held that the Court must give deference to the
group's assertion regarding the nature of its expression and the
degree of impairment caused by the forced inclusion of a member.'06
This leaves those who speak for the group as the sole judges of
whether or not antidiscrimination laws should apply to the group.
As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent: "This is an astounding view
of the law. I am unaware of any previous instance in which our
analysis of the scope of a constitutional right was determined by
100. Id. at 659.
101. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
102. Id. at 623.
103. Id. at 626.
104. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. 640.
105. The Roberts court merely emphasized that the enforcement of the law would not
materially interfere with the Jaycees message. The Court did not hold that if the law had
materially interfered with the Jaycees' message, they would have been entitled to
an exemption.
106. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. 640.
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looking at what a litigant asserts in his or her brief and inquiring
no further." °v
Nevertheless, Justice Stevens' surprise seems unwarranted.
The deference afforded by the majority to the Boy Scouts' assertions,
as to the nature of their expression and what would impair it, is
merely an expansion of the noninterference doctrine to other
expressive associations which has hitherto applied to religious
institutions. As Michael McConnell approvingly notes, the Boy
Scouts decision is a move in the direction of using the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses as models for heightening the protection
afforded to civil associations."0 8 The Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that churches have the right to decide internal matters without
governmental interference."° The circuit courts have used these
cases to create a ministerial exception that exempts religious
institutions from antidiscrimination laws in the selection of
ministerial employees. 10 The exception precludes civil courts from
adjudicating employment discrimination suits filed by these
employees. 1 The reasoning behind the ministerial exception, which
is a license to discriminate, is that "it is designed to protect the
freedom of the church to select those who will carry out its religious
mission."" 2 Religious institutions are not required to justify their
allegedly discriminatory decisions."1
3
The basis for the Boy Scouts decision is more narrow as it
requires that the expressive association's expression be impaired by
not discriminating. It nevertheless uses the exact same reasoning
as is applied to religious institutions through the Free Exercise
Clause, to grant all expressive associations the right to free exercise
of discrimination. The Boy Scouts decision is simply an expansion
of the right of religious entities to discriminate with respect to
ministerial positions to all expressive entities and to all positions
within them. In the words of Justice Stevens, this expansion
107. See id. at 687.
108. See Singling out Religion, supra note 33, at 23.
109. See, e.g, Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am.,
344 U.S. 94 (1952); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976);
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
110. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996)[hereinafter
Catholic Univ.].
111. See id.; see also, Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164 (4th Cir. 1985).
112. Catholic Univ., 83 F. 3d 455,462.
113. Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th
Cir. 1985) ("IT]he free exercise clause of the First Amendment protects the act of a decision
rather than a motivation behind it. In these sensitive areas, the state may no more require
a minimum basis in doctrinal reasoning than it may supervise doctrinal content").
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"render[s] civil rights legislation a nullity."11 Equally, this
expansion exposes the inherently problematic nature of this right to
begin with, even when applied to religious institutions alone.
Aware of the problem created by giving deference to the group's
view of what would impair its expression, the Court in Boy Scouts
hastened to reassure "tihat is not to say that an expressive
association can erect a shield against antidiscrimination laws
simply by asserting that mere acceptance of a member from a
particular group would impair its message. 1""' The Court explained
that Mr. Dale was a leader in his community and was open and
honest about his sexual orientation and that as a result, his
presence in the Boy Scouts would send a message that the Boy
Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of
behavior.116 Therefore, the Court tried to reassure us that had Dale
kept his homosexuality less conspicuous, then the Court might have
concluded that the Boy Scouts do not have the right to revoke his
position.1 ' Setting aside the highly questionable nature of this
"don't ask don't tell policy," unlike homosexuals or atheists who
might succeed in concealing their true identities, women and many
racial minorities are incapable of such concealment. If a group
asserts that allowing a woman to hold a certain position impairs the
group's message, the woman cannot simply conceal the fact that she
is a woman and continue to hold her position without allegedly
impairing the group's message. Affording deference to the group's
assertions concerning the nature of its expression and its views
toward what would impair its expression will inevitably lead to
denying women positions in the group.
The legal situation in the U.S. today is that the First
Amendment has been transformed into an extremely wide shield
against antidiscrimination laws. The traditional distinction between
religious and nonreligious associations has been largely obliterated
both in terms of the allocation of government funds and in terms of
immunity against antidiscrimination laws. Religious institutions
such as social service providers are now entitled to receive
government funds on an equal basis with non-religious institutions.
Nonreligious institutions that fall under the definition of expressive
associations are now afforded the right to free exercise of
discrimination; a right that has in the past been reserved to
religious associations. As more and more institutions have the right
114. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 687.
115. Id at 653.
116. See i& at 653.
117. See id.
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to free exercise of discrimination and continue to be, or become,
eligible to receive government funds, the risk that government
funds will be used to support discrimination dramatically increases.
F. Women's Equality and the Constitution
As Mary Becker has observed, the U.S. Constitution is a
conservative document interpreted by a conservative institution.118
Such a combination does not bode well for women's rights, and it is
not surprising that it was not until 1971 that the American Supreme
Court first struck down a gender based classification as violating the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."9 Since then,
the Equal Protection Clause has been repeatedly invoked to protect
a woman's right to equality. The Supreme Court has not subjected
sex based classifications to strict scrutiny, but applies a heightened
intermediate scrutiny requiring an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" for sex based classifications. 120 Feminists note the
protection afforded to women in American jurisprudence is far from
being consistent with the standards of protection for women in other
western countries, or with the protections afforded to women in
international law through CEDAW."
The attempts to pass the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and
include women's right to equality in the Constitution and ensure the
strict scrutiny of sex based classifications have failed, leaving the
determination of the appropriate standard of review in the hands of
the Court. 22 The failure of ERA can be attributed in large part to
the mobilization of conservative religious groups against its
passage."2 The "ERA was portrayed as anti-family and threatening
to morality and traditional values."12' The ERA's opponents drew on
the support of fundamentalist and Catholic constituencies that
118. See Mary Becker, Towards a Progressive Politics and a Progressive Constitution, 69
FoRDHAM L. REv. 2007, 2007 (2001)[hereinafter Progressive Constitution).
119. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Joan A. Lukey & Jeffrey A. Smagula, Do We
Still Need a Federal Equal Rights Amendment?, B. B. J., Feb. 2000, at 10.(arguing that this
decision was prompted by the mounting pressure on Congress to pass the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA) incorporating women's right to equality into the U.S. Constitution.)
120. Personnel Admin. Of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,273 (1979).
121. See CEDAW, supra note 13; Progressive Constitution, supra note 119, at 2014-38; Ann
Elizabeth Mayer, Reflections on the Proposed United States Reservations to CEDAW: Should
the Constitution be an Obstacle to Human Rights?, 23 HASrINGs CONST. L. Q. 727, 741-
47(1996).
122. Lukey & Smagula, supra note 119, at 11.
123. Mayer, supra note 121, at 770.
124. Id. at 770.
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viewed women's equality as prohibited by the Bible.' An increasingly
conservative Supreme Court has most recently started cutting back
even at the heightened intermediate scrutiny standard, applying it
in a way which the four dissenting justices in Nguyen v. INS called
"a stranger to our precedents".'26 Relying on stereotypes about
motherhood and about women's and men's different responsibility
for children conceived out of wedlock the Court affirmed a statute
which sets different requirements for men and women in the
transmission of citizenship to out-of-wedlock children born outside
the U.S. to a U.S. citizen parent. 127
While on many occasions, the Constitution has served to
advance women's rights, it has at the same time also been used to
limit women's rights."2 The Supreme Court used the Constitution
to strike down the civil rights remedy created by the Violence
against Women Act, which benefited female victims of gender
motivated crimes."2 The Supreme Court's holding in Boy Scouts
deploys the Constitution as a shield against antidiscrimination
legislation.'i0 This is another instance in which the Constitution
is used to subvert rights rather than to advance them' and which
has far reaching effects on women's right to equality. The Boy
Scouts case is an example of the public-private split created by the
Constitution, which is used by the Supreme Court to subvert
progressive legislation that aims to advance equality in the
private sphere." 2
Written over 200 years ago, the U.S. Constitution has
consistently been more conducive to the advancement of First
Amendment rights than it has been to the advancement of women's
right to equality. While continuous efforts by feminists to utilize the
Constitution in order to advance women's rights have been quite
successful, this success has been curtailed by the clear priority the
Constitution grants negative rights and a limited government. 133
The renewed emphasis on community autonomy and on neutrality
towards religion has put even this limited success at risk by
125. See id. at 770-71.
126. Nguyen v. I.N.S 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001).
127. See id.
128. See The Politics of Women's Wrongs, supra note 76 at 453-4.
129. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000); see, e.g., Deena Hausner,
United States v. Morrison: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Restriction of Congress'
Fourteenth Amendment Powers, 11 B.U. PuB. INT. L. J., 261, 261 (2002).
130. 530 U.S. at 653.
131. See id.
132. The Politics of Women's Wrongs, supra note 76, at 456(claiming that the Bill of Rights
incorporates a private-public split that is detrimental to women).
133. See id.
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simultaneously freeing civil society from antidiscrimination
obligations and increasing the power of religious organizations,
which oppose women's rights, through government funding.
III. RELIGION, COMMUNITY, AND THE STATE IN ISRAEL
A. Introduction
In the U.S., the tension between religious liberty and women's
right to equality has been obscured by the seemingly comprehensive
protection of civil rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. In Israel,
this tension has always been out in the open. For various political
and historical reasons, at the inception of the State of Israel its
leaders decided, to establish a regime of partial integration between
religion and the state, and to attempt to ensure women's right to
equality within the confines of this regime. 134 The two most
important signifiers of this regime of partial integration are the
definition of Israel as a "Jewish and democratic state"135 and the
incorporation of religious personal laws into the civil law.13 Israel's
Declaration of Establishment states that Israel is established as "a
Jewish state."137 The Declaration also states that Israel will "ensure
complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants
irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of
religion, conscience, language, education and culture."' 3 In 1992,
the dual nature of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state gained
constitutional status when a provision was incorporated into the
newly enacted Basic Law: Human Dignity and Basic Law: Freedom
of Occupation stating that their purpose was to give constitutional
status to the values of the state of Israel as a "Jewish and
democratic state".3 9 Opinions are divided as to whether the term
134. For two different accounts of these reasons see Yonatan Shapira, Secular Politicians
and the Status of Religion in the State of Israel, in MULTICULTURALISM IN A DEMOCRATIC AND
JEWISH STATE, THE ARIEL ROSEN-ZVI MEMORIAL BOOK 661 (Menachem Mautner et al. eds.,
1998); Lucy Endel Bassli, Comment, The Future of Combining Synagogue and the State in
Israel: What Have We Learned in the First 50 Years?, 22 Hous. J. INrT L. 477, 487-89 (2000).
135. Basic Law: Human Dignity & Liberty, 1992, S. H. 1391, 60, available at
http'J/www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00hiO. See also, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation,
1994, S. H. 1454, 90, available at http://www.mfa.gov.iltmfa/go.aspMFAH00hj0.
136. For a detailed discussion of the incorporation of religious law into the civil law see
infra Part III(B).
137. THE DECLARATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, I 11 (Israel, May 14,
1948) available athttp'Jwww.mfa.gov.ilmfalgo.asp?MFAHOOhbO.
138. Id. at 1 13.
139. See supra note 137.
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"Jewish" in the Basic Laws should be read as relating to the Jewish
religion or to Jewish nationality or to both.1'4 Many feel that the
definition of Israel as a Jewish state buttresses and perhaps even
justifies the imposition of Jewish religious laws on the Jewish
population in Israel.14
Israel is defined as a Jewish state and this undoubtedly
adversely affects the non Jewish population," 2 but the Jewish
religion is not imposed on the non-Jewish citizens of Israel.
Following the Ottoman-Millet system, each religious community in
Israel is subject to its own religious personal laws. The violation of
religious liberty and the application of discriminatory religious laws
do not occur between religious groups. Application of religious law
takes place within each religious community through an imposition
of the religious laws of the community even on those community
members who do not wish to be subject to them. Each person has
the legal right to change her religious affiliation and exit her
religious community."" Other ways of avoiding the application of
religious personal laws are marrying abroad or living as common
law spouses, a status which has been legally recognized through
both legislation and judicial decisions." The state-sanctioned
violation of rights which occurs within each religious group and not
between groups is what makes the Israeli case pertinent to the
American case. The American model of separation between religion
and the state similarly results in state-sanctioned discrimination
against women within their own community. This discrimination
translates into women's subordinate status in society as a whole.
140. See Avigdor Levontin, 'Jewish and Democratic"- Personal Reflections, in THE STATE
OF ISRAEL: BETWEEN JUDAISM AND DEMOCRACY, 251 (Yossi David ed., 2000)(taking a position
against interpreting the term Jewish in the Basic Laws as including the Jewish religion). See
cf. Menahem Alon, Constitution by Legislation: The Values of a Jewish and Democratic State
in Light of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Personal Freedom, 17 IUNEI MISHPAT 659,668-70
(1993) (taking a position supporting the inclusion of the Jewish religion in the term "Jewish").
141. See Ruth Gavison, A Jewish and Democratic State: Challenges and Risks, in
MULTICULTURALMM IN A DEMOCRATIC AND JEWiSH STATE, supra note 136, at 213, 273
(describing the position of the Chief Justice of the Israeli Supreme Court, Aharon Barak).
(Gavison's own position is that the definition of Israel as a Jewish state does not justify the
imposition of the Jewish religious personal law. See id. at 267).
142. See, e.g., THE JEWiSH-ARAB RIFT IN ISRAEL: A READER (Ruth Gavison et al. eds.,
2000)(indicating that as Israel has from its inception been a state dedicated to promoting
mainlythe well-being of its Jewish citizens, and of foreign Jews, this has dire effects on the
rights of the Arab citizens of Israel and exposes them to considerable and enduring
discrimination in all aspects of life).
143. Religious Community Ordinance (Conversion) [last modified 6/14/471.
144. See Carmel Shalev, The Freedom to Contract into Marriage and Cohabitation
(Cohabitation and Marriage Outside the Religious Law), in WOMEN'S STATUS IN ISRAELI LAW
AND SocIETY, 459 (F. Raday et. al. eds., 1995). (Detailing ways to avoid the application of
religious personal laws).
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The purpose of presenting the legal situation in Israel is to
enable a comparison between this regime and the regime of
separation between religion and the state currently existing in the
U.S. The Israeli regime of state sanctioned imposition of religious
law according to religious affiliation is clearly in violation of
individual rights. Considering the patriarchal nature of the religious
laws of the various communities, it is clearly in violation of women's
right to equality. Despite the perception that the American
separation between religion and the state is sufficient to guarantee
women's right to equality, such separation helps perpetuate
women's inequality in much the same way as the Israeli regime of
partial integration. It is to a significant degree a similar violation of
women's rights.
B. Religious Personal Status Laws
The lack of civil laws of marriage and divorce is perhaps the
most important signifier of the integration between religion and the
state in Israel. Israel recognizes only marriages and divorces that
are conducted by religious state officials according to the religious
laws of the several religious communities recognized by Israeli
law. 1" This includes the Jewish religion, the Muslim religion and
several Christian denominations. 14 This is largely a continuation of
the legal situation that existed during the rule of the Ottoman
Empire and the subsequent British Mandate in Palestine.147 The
laws of all the religious denominations recognized by the state
discriminate against women to varying degrees; this state of affairs
is extremely detrimental to the equality rights of women.'4
In Orthodox Jewish law, only the husband has the power to
divorce his wife. If the woman does not or cannot agree to the
divorce, the husband can receive permission to marry a second
wife149 . A wife cannot divorce her husband without his consent, nor
145. The authority of the various religious communities was established through
legislation from the period of the British Mandate that was later incorporated into Israeli law,
Sign 51(1) of the King's Order in Council, 1922. The detailed authority of the Jewish
Rabbinical Courts is set out in the Jurisdiction of Rabbinical Courts (Marriage and Divorce)
Act 1953. The detailed authority of the Muslim religious courts can still be found in Sign 52
of the King's Order in Council, (1922).
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See Frances Raday, On Equality, in WOMEN'S STATUS IN ISRAELI LAW AND SOcIETY,
supra note 146, at 19, 48 [hereinafter On Equality].
149. See Eliav Shohetman, The Status of Woman in Marriage and Divorce Laws, in
WOMEN'S STATUS IN ISRAELI LAW AND SOCIETY, supra note 146, at 380, 386(indicating that if
the woman becomes mentally ill, or if the couple has been married for ten years and she has
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can she get permission to marry a second husband. 5 ° Unless the
husband agrees to divorce her she will remain married to him for
the rest of their lives.' 5 ' This is extremely detrimental to women,
because the husband's refusal to divorce may prevent the woman
from ever remarrying and starting a new family." 2 Many husbands
use the veto power that Orthodox Judaism grants to extort
concessions from their wives in the division of the couple's property,
child custody, payment of alimony, and child support following the
dissolution of marriage.
53
Similar to Orthodox Jewish law, Muslim law, which applies to
the Muslim citizens of Israel, also discriminates against women. In
Muslim law, only the husband has the ability to divorce the wife and
he can do so simply by stating that he is divorcing her."4 The
husband can even announce a partial divorce, which does not end
the marriage immediately. The husband decides within a certain
period of time, without need for her consent, whether he takes the
wife back.'55 Muslim law allows a man to take up to four wives
provided that he treats them equally and justly."5 6 In Muslim law,
only the man is the legal guardian of the children. The mother has
custody of the children until boys are seven years old and girls are
nine years old, unless she remarries, in which case the custody is
immediately given to the father."7
not given birth to any children (there is no need to wait ten years if it is medically proven
before that that the wife is barren), or if the woman has been forbidden to him or has become
forbidden to him because she has betrayed him, or if the man states to the religious court that
he is repulsed by his wife and the court is convinced of his honesty, the court may permit the
man to take a second wife).
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Women, Religion and Multiculturalism in Israel, 5 UCLA
J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 339,349-350 (2000Xaccording to Orthodox Judaism, if the woman has
children with another man while still married to her husband the children are considered
"bastards" (mamzerim) and are forbidden from marrying other Jews, except for converts or
other "bastards". This is an extremely potent way of preventing the woman from disregarding
her husband's refusal to grant the divorce.).
153. See id at 350.
154. See Aharon Laish, The Status of the Muslim Woman in the Shari'a Courts in Israel,
in WOMEN'S STATUS IN ISRAELI LAW AND SOCIETY, supra note 146, at 364, 367.
155. See id; Steven Adler, The Bedouin Woman and Welfare Benefits in the Polygamous
Family, in WOMEN'S STATUS IN ISRAELI LAW AND SOCIETY, supra note 146, at 133, 136
(describing how this right the husband has over his wife has been used to bypass the
prohibition against polygamy in the Israeli criminal code). See infra notes 164-165 and
accompanying text. The husband temporarily divorces his first wife, marries a second wife
and then declares that he is taking the first one back without need for her consent).
156. See Laish, supra note 154, at 366.
157. See id. at 369.
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Parallel to the incorporation of the religious discriminatory laws
of the various recognized religious communities, the state attempted
to ensure women's right to equality in all areas except marriage and
divorce by passing civil legislation. The Women's Equal Rights Act,
in existence as early as 1951, declares that men and women are
considered equal with regard to any legal action and that any law
that discriminates against women on account of their sex is void." 8
The religious laws of marriage and divorce clearly discriminate
against women, and because the legislature had no intention of
voiding these laws, the Women's Equal Rights Act specifically states
it is not applicable to marriage and divorce laws.'5 9 The Supreme
Court has called the Women's Equal Rights Act a "regal act" whose
intent of ensuring equality for women should inform any legal
action, 160 but the Act is incapable of overruling discriminatory
religious laws regarding marriage and divorce. This situation is a
reflection of the general problem: although women's right to
equality is considered important enough to warrant extensive
protection, it is subordinated to the higher value of defending
communal religious practices.
The Israeli legislature has passed other civil laws aimed at
curbing some of the most egregiously discriminatory religious
practices. 161 One example is the Israeli criminal law that makes it
a criminal offense for a man to marry more than one wife. 62 The law
includes exceptions that allow a man to marry a second wife if he
receives special permission either from a Jewish rabbinical court or
from a Muslim Shari'a court.'63 Both Jewish and Muslim courts
grant this special permission only under special circumstances.
164
The existence of these exceptions is an important indication for the
primacy of religious law in matters of marriage and divorce in the
Israeli legal system. As the exceptions are based on religious law,
they apply only to men.
A man who marries more than one wife without getting the
aforementioned permission commits a criminal offense and might
158. See Women's Equal Rights Law, 1951 § I(A).
159. See id. § 4.
160. H.C. 1000/92 Bavli v. The Great Rabbinical Court, Jerusalem, 48(2) P.D. 221, 240.
161. See Amendment to the Criminal Law (Polygamous Marriage) Act §2 (1959). The act
was incorporated into the Israeli Penal Code, 1977 (§§ 176-80).
162. See id.
163. See id at § 5. (creates an exception for marriage according to permission granted by
the Jewish Rabbinical court); see supra note 151 listing circumstances under which such
permission will be granted. Section 180 of the Israeli Penal Code creates the exception for a
permission given by the Muslim Shari'a court. The court grants this permission only if the
wife is mentally ill or has remained missing for seven years).
164. See id.
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face punishment. 68 His multiple marriages are valid under the
exception because they are marriages that are compatible with
religious law." In some instances, the state even recognizes these
de facto marriages for the purposes of paying welfare benefits. 6
This creates a financial incentive for the continuation of the practice
of polygamous marriages."6 The Muslim practice allowing a man to
divorce a woman without her consent simply by declaring her
divorced is another religious practice that the Penal Code
criminalized.'69 Section 181A of the Israeli Penal Code makes it a
crime punishable by up to five years imprisonment for a man to
declare that his wife is divorced without her consent and without an
official court decision.170
The Israeli legislature has enacted civil legislation dealing with
issues related to the dissolution of the marriage although the rules
regarding the formation and the dissolution of the marriage are
strictly religious."'7 These issues include the division of property and
guardianship over the children.'72 The civil legislation manifests the
principle of equality between the sexes; it preserves a woman's right
to maintain her property upon her marriage it divides all the
couple's property equally between them upon the dissolution of the
marriage, and it gives the parents equal rights of guardianship over
their children.'73 The principle of equality between the sexes applies
in most cases related to the aforementioned issues, including those
heard before religious courts. Not included are cases in which both
parties, being eighteen years or older, have agreed before the court
to have their case decided according to the religious laws of their
respective religious community. 7'
Religious courts are obliged to apply the principle of equality
absent an express agreement between parties regarding religious
law application ."7 In reality, the religious courts are reluctant to
apply the principle of equality and this reluctance manifests in their
decisions. 76 The reluctance of the Jewish Rabbinical court to apply
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. Adler, supra note 155, at 145-47.
168. See id.
169. Israeli Penal Code § 181(A) (1977).
170. See id.
171. Women's Equal Rights Act, §§ 2,4 (1951); Financial Relations Act (1973).
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See Women's Equal Rights Act § 7(b) (1951).
175. See supra note 171.
176. See H.C. 1000/92, Bavli v. The Great Rabbinical Court, Jerusalem, 48(2) P.D. 221;
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the principle of equality between the husband and the wife in the
division of the marital property is so strong that the court has
refused to comply with an order by the Israeli Supreme Court
compelling it to do so.'7 7 In the Bavli case, the Israeli Supreme
Court reasoned that as a state organ, the Jewish religious court was
obliged to apply civil law in all areas it was not given specific
authority by the state to apply religious law. 7 ' The Jewish religious
court possesses only authority to apply religious laws to issues of
marital status and not to the property issues accompanying the
dissolution of a marriage.'79 In the Bavli case the Israeli Supreme
Court held that the religious court had to apply the principle of
equality between the sexes to the division of property. 8 0 In its
decision the court strove to limit the extent of discrimination
against women inherent in religious laws. Howevwer, it was willing
to intervene only because the Jewish religious court had
transgressed the authority given to it by the civil law, by applying
the discriminatory religious law when it should have applied civil
law. The Israeli Supreme Court in the Bavli case did not intervene
in the religious law or question the legitimacy of applying
discriminatory religious law when the civil legislature approved its
application. The Bavli decision cannot ameliorate the problem that
many women renounce their property rights and guardianship
rights to obtain the husband's consent to the divorce, as his consent
is required by the Jewish religious law to end the marriage.
The discrimination against women due to the primacy of
religious law in matters of marriage and divorce manifests in the
substantive law but also in the state organs that apply the law.'
The religious courts, comprised solely of male judges, apply the laws
of marriage and divorce to all Israelis according to religious
affiliations. 8 1 The leaders of the various religious communities in
Israel all interpret their respective religious laws as forbidding
women from serving as judges in religious courts.'3 Positions in
religious councils and in the official bodies that elect municipal
Frances Raday, Religion and Equality in the Mirror of Judicial Decisions, in 2 BERENSON
BOOK 341, 366 (Aharon Barak et al. eds., 2000)[hereinafter Religion and Equality].
177. See id.
178. See H.C. 1000/92, Bavli v. The Great Rabbinical Court, Jerusalem, 48(2) P.D. 221, § 28.
179. See id. The court's authority to apply religious law to issues of property is subject to
the consent of the parties.
180. See id. at § 37.
181. On Equality, supra note 148, at 29-30.
182. See id.
183. See id.
20041 489
490 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 10:459
Rabbis also excluded women.1 ' Both religious councils and the
bodies that elect municipal rabbis are official bodies that state
legislation created and funds. Both are part of a scheme of state-
created and state-funded Jewish religious services that were
granted to the Jewish community." 5 The Israeli Supreme Court has
decided that exclusion from these positions is illegal.186 The court
based its decision on the primacy of women's right to equality, but
its endorsement of this right, when contrasted with communal
religious practices, was decidedly qualified. 187 The court stated that
women's right to equality, although paramount, might not apply if
it conflicts with applicable religious norm or prevents the proper
functioning of the relevant state organ."' In the cases concerning
positions in electoral bodies choosing rabbis and religious councils,
the court held that the exclusion of women was illegal because there
is no principle of Jewish religious law (Halakha) that prevents
women from filling these positions.8 9
Despite the Court's strict adherence to the primacy of religious
norms over women's rights and its modest record of rebuking
religious authorities for exceeding their mandates, the Jewish
religious community in Israel has accused the court of judicial
activism and meddling in religious affairs.190 Religious authorities
such as the Rabbinical courts have refused to obey its judgments.'9 '
This demonstrates the inability of a regime that incorporates
religious laws into its civil legislation to set limits on the priority
of state sponsored religious norms over individual rights. This
problem is not unlike the problem created in regimes that advocate
the separation between religion and the state, such as the U.S.
Such regimes abdicate the duty to protect equal rights to prevent
entanglement with religion and the restriction of religious liberties
in matters like discrimination against women by their
religious employers.
184. See Jewish Religious Services Act (1971). (The state also funds various religious
services given to other recognized religious communities such as the Muslim community;
these services are seriously under-funded in comparison to the Jewish services.) See, e.g., H.C.
240/98, Addalla v. Minister of Religious Affairs.
185. See id.
186. H.C. 153/87, Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs, 42(2) P.D. 221 (regarding
religious councils); H.C. 1/88 Poraz v. Tel Aviv City Council, 42(2) P.D. 309 (regarding the
body electing the Tel Aviv Municipal Rabbi).
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See On Equality, supra note 148 at 31.
190. See Religion and Equality, supra note 176, at 386-88.
191. Id.
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Theoretically, following the precedents concerning religious
councils in Israel, women could petition the Israeli Supreme Court
stating that women's right to equality mandates the appointment
of women as religious judges if such a holding is not in direct
contravention of Jewish religious norms. In a recent amendment to
the Women's Equal Rights Act, which added a provision requiring
adequate representation for women in various public institutions,'92
another provision was added, that exempted appointments to
religious courts from the requirements of the Act.
193
An expert in Jewish religious law and feminist commentator
claims that the appointment of women to serve as judges in
religious courts is not forbidden by Jewish religious law.94
According to her, more women are acquiring knowledge in Jewish
law due to gradual changes within the Orthodox community and
these changes might eventually legitimize the appointment of
women as religious judges.19 She argues that the amendment
exempting appointments of religious judges from the requirements
of the Women's Equal Rights Act inhibits what might result from
gradual changes in the prevailing interpretation of Jewish religious
law. It is important to point out that this claim assumes
the existence of an interventionist court willing to compel religious
leaders to act in ways that they perceive as contrary to religious
edicts. Absent an interventionist civil court, the decision on when
and whether to appoint women as religious judges would remain
with religious leaders regardless of the provisions of the civil
law. Judging by past precedent it seems that if faced with such
a case, the Israeli Supreme Court would have adopted an approach
similar to that of the U.S. Supreme Court in Boy Scouts by accepting
the assertion of the community religious leaders as conclusive
and refusing to intervene, even absent a civil law prohibiting
its intervention.
Similarly, in Boy Scouts, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to
apply existing antidiscrimination legislation and instead created a
common law exemption from anti discrimination legislation
applicable to all expressive associations. In Israel, the affirmation
of religiously based discrimination against women is stated
explicitly in the law. In the U.S., the affirmation of both religious
192. Women's Equal Rights Act § 6(C)(1951).
193. Id. at §7(c).
194. Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 152, at 353-54.
195. Id.
196. See Id.
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and nonreligious discrimination is a result of judicial decisions. In
both cases, the practical result is that the discrimination continues
unhindered. The difference is that the religious exemption from
equality norms is clearly stated in Israeli law, whereas American
law only appears to grant a strong protection against discrimination
through anti-discrimination legislation, when in reality this
protection is rendered a nullity by judicial decisions. 197 Bearing in
mind the reality of judicially sanctioned discrimination, it is not at
all clear that the illusion of equality maintained by American anti-
discrimination legislation is less detrimental to women's rights than
Israeli law's outright declaration of discrimination.
C. Segregation in Public Services
The clear pattern of subordinating gender equality to religious
values that was formed in Israel through incorporation of religious
personal law into the legal system proved extremely conducive to
the acceptance of demands by Ultra Orthodox Jewish community
leaders. These demands were for state-sponsored segregation
between men and women on public bus routes traveling mainly
through ultra-orthodox neighborhoods and in vocational training
courses given by the Ministry of Labor.19 The Traffic Minister
initiated segregation in public transportation following a recom-
mendation by a committee appointed by him to investigate ways to
encourage the use of public transportation by the ultra-Orthodox
community. 99 While men sit in the front of the bus, women are
directed to sit in the back of the bus, so that the men would not be
able to view the women and entertain impure thoughts about
them.2' The segregation is achieved on an allegedly voluntary basis
by convincing the mostly ultra-orthodox Jewish public to respect the
values and beliefs of the community. 20 1
197. See, e.g., Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. 640, 687 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198. See, Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 152, at 362-63.
199. Id at 363. The committee issuing the recommendation included only one woman. I&
Similarly, only one woman was present of sixteen participants in the meeting where they
decided to adopt the committee's recommendations. A.
200. Alon Harel, Aharon Shanrah, The Segregation Between the Sexes in Public
Transportation, 2 ALEI MISHPAT, 703, 720, 723 (2002).
201. Id. While the arrangement is allegedly voluntary, it is hard to imagine that an ultra-
orthodox woman who objects would intentionally disregard the sign directing women to sit
at the back of the bus and sit in the front, next to a man, in contravention of community
practice. See generally id. at 363-64 (concerning women's agency and consent to
discrimination). If this were to happen, men assigned by the leaders of the ultra orthodox
community to ride the buses to enforce the allegedly voluntary segregation would discipline
her. Da'a Hadar, This is Their Place, Ha'aretz pg. B7 (11/30/2001).
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The reasoning behind the segregation in vocational training
courses is similar. In order to prevent sitting the sexes together in
the classroom, some courses are assigned to ultra-orthodox men
while others are assigned to ultra-orthodox women.' 2 Thus, the
courses are not only segregated according to sex, but because the
courses given to men and women are not identical, the person's sex
dictates the options from which she or he can choose. 20 3 Both
segregation in public transportation routes and segregation in
vocational training courses have been challenged by the Israeli
Women's Network before the Israeli Supreme Court.' In both cases,
the Court refused to intervene and persuaded the plaintiffs to
withdraw their petitions in order to avoid a ruling against them.2 5
In 2000, Israeli law expanded the right to equality when the
Knesset, the Israeli parliament, passed a new law forbidding
discrimination in public accommodations. 2' The law forbids
discrimination on numerous bases including race, religion,
nationality, sex, sexual orientation, personal status and disability,
in places of public accommodation and in public services.0' An
exception states that offering sexually segregated services will not
be considered discrimination in contravention of the law when the
prohibition on segregation will prevent some of the public from
using the public accommodation or public service.2' The legality of
the segregation is examined by considering, inter alia, the type of
service, its importance, the existence of alternative services and the
needs of the public that might be injured by the segregation. 2 9 This
exception to the law was created to appease the ultra-orthodox
religious politicians who demanded recognition for the legitimacy
of sexual segregation in public accomodations for religious and
202. H.C 7942/98 Ovadia v. Minister of Labor (Jan. 14, 1999) (brief for petitioners) (on file
with author).
203. Id.
204. H.C 7942/98 Ovadia v. Minister of Labor (Jan. 14, 1999) (regarding segregation in
vocational training); H.C 5079/97, Israeli Women's Network v. Minister of Traffic (May 5,
1999) (regarding segregation in public transportation).
205. Id.; see also Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 152, at 363-64 (regarding the petition
concerning segregation in public transportation).
206. Prevention of Discrimination in Products, Services, and Entrance to Public
Entertainment and Public Places Law, S. H. 58 art. 3(a)(3) (2001) [hereinafter Prevention of
Discrimination Law].
207. Id. at Art.3(a).
208. Id.
209. Id. at Art.3(d)(3). Interestingly, in Boy Scouts, Justice Stevens quotes with approval
a similar exemption to the New Jersey public accommodations law to rebut the Boy Scouts'
claim that accepting Dale's claim would mean that the Boy Scouts might be obliged to accept
girls. 530 U.S. at 681 n.13.
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cultural reasons.210 Thus, state law has recognized the legitimacy of
religious and cultural motivations for segregating women despite of
the impact such segregation has on equality. While this legislation
is the pinnacle, it is significant that the Israeli Supreme Court
refused to rule against the segregation of women even before the
law sanctioned such segregation.
Many of those who argue that instituting religious personal law
as the law of the land constitutes discrimination against women and
a violation of human rights have hailed state-supported segregation
between men and women in services provided to the ultra-orthodox
community, labeling it as an act of toleration, human rights and
respect towards diverse ways of life.
However, state sponsorship of sexually-segregated vocational
training courses and public bus routes in ultra-orthodox neighborhoods
is a violation of women's right to equality, and is as unjust as the
application of discriminatory religious personal law to all persons
according to their religious affiliations. In both cases discriminatory
and contestable practices are given precedence over individual
rights and are reified as fundamental community values, thereby
becoming uncontestable. 2' Further the decision of the United States
210. Gila Stopler, Countenancing the Oppression of Women: How Liberals Tolerate
Religious and Cultural Practices that Discriminate Against Women, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 154, 171-72 (2003).
211. See, e.g., Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Israeli Democracy, Religion, and the Practice of
Halizah in Jewish Law, 11 UCLA WOMEN'S L. J. 45, 52 (2000). The biggest civil rights
organization in Israel, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), which considers the
lack of civil marriage and divorce laws in Israel to be a civil rights violation, refused to
espouse the view that segregation between men and women in vocational training courses
constitutes discrimination per se. The ACRI adopted a board resolution which states that if
the segregation is done to cater to the needs of the community and if the separate services are
equal, then such segregation does not constitute a violation of rights. On the contrary, it is an
enhancement of the rights of the community. Decision of the board of The Association of Civil
Rights in Israel from 11112/98 (on file with author).
212. Those who condemn the imposition of religious family laws on the Jewish community
in Israel while condoning the state supported segregation of the sexes in public services
directed to the Jewish Ultra-orthodox sub-community point to the homogeneous nature of the
latter as opposed to the heterogeneous nature of the former to justify their position. See
Cohen-Almagor, supra note 211 at 52. (discussing how the desire to enforce beliefs and
practices within homogenous Jewish sects is not problematic until the beliefs and practices
extend beyond that community or interfere with the minority's ability to dissent). However,
if the lack of dissent is assumed without verification, and is then enforced and reinforced
through law then the lack of dissent becomes the creation of the state rather than the
explanation for its actions. For example, a twenty-year-old ultra-orthodox woman told one of
the few reporters who bothered to ask ultra-orthodox women how they felt about having to
sit in the back of buses: 'Men need this segregation. We are doing this for them... At first I
felt strange sitting in the back. I climbed on the bus, saw that only men were sitting in the
front and one of them signaled me to go to the end of the bus. But you get used to it, just as
you get used to anything else..." Da'a Hadar, This is Their Place, supra note 201.
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Supreme Court in the Boy Scouts case to exempt expressive
associations from anti- discrimination laws is a similarly unjust
state preference of power over equality. All of these cases
demonstrate state power used in the service of community leaders
and the patriarchal and hierarchical norms these leaders seek to
impose for their own benefit, at the expense of the basic right to
equality of the community's weaker members and their right to
participate in the shaping of the community in which they live.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGION, COMMUNITY AND THE
STATE AND ITS EFFECTS ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS
A. Religion, Community and the State - Is Separation Enough to
Guarantee Women's Right to Equality?
The preceding discussion of the relationship between religion,
community, and the state in the United States and Israel and its
effects on women's rights, makes it clear that while the relationship
between religion and the state in Israel and in the United States is
quite different, both countries give preference to religious and
communal norms over women's rights. Consequently, in both
countries, the relationship between religion, community and the
state is a very serious obstacle to achieving equality for women. The
Israeli problem arises from the partial integration of religion and
the state, specifically from the conviction that the state should
support some religious and cultural norms even if these are
discriminatory towards women.213 The problem in the United States
arises from the way the separation between religion, community
and the state is carried out, and the belief that the state should
allow religious and other expressive associations a free hand in
discriminating against women while concurrently protecting the
right of the associations' leaders to practice discrimination against
weaker members of their own groups.21
Accordingly, ensuring equality for women requires more than
separation between religion and the state. Far more important than
the official separation itself is setting priorities. The crucial question
is what the state chooses to prioritize. If, for various reasons, the
state chooses to prioritize religion and community over women's
rights, then regardless of the form of relationship between religion
213. See, e.g., discussion supra pp. 488-90.
214. See, e.g., discussion supra pp. 491-92.
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and the state, separation or not, women's right to equality cannot
be ensured.
This fact has been recognized by the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW)." While not taking a stand on the proper relationship
between religion and the state, CEDAW has set a clear priority for
women's rights over religious, cultural and social practices that
discriminate against women, primarily by requiring states to take
all necessary measures to eliminate these practices in both the
public and the private spheres.216 Thus, CEDAW has recognized that
in a world where women are not equal to men and where religious,
cultural and social practices and norms are used to maintain this
inequality and subordinate and disempower women, change can
only be achieved through an active use of state power within the
community.1 Regimes of separation between religion and the state,
including the American regime, which places the highest value on
state non-interference with religion, are highly obstructive to such
a goal.
Theoretically and even practically, regimes of integration exist
between religion and the state that secure women's rights in a much
better way than the American regime of separation. One example is
Sweden, which until very recently maintained a regime of
integration between religion and the state but nevertheless was,
and still is, one of the most progressive countries where women's
rights are concerned. 2 8 The priority given in Sweden to women's
right to equality led to the incorporation of women into the
priesthood as early as 1960.219 The fact that religion and the state
have always been integrated in Sweden has made it much easier for
the Swedish state to use its power to facilitate the opening of the
priesthood to women.2" The Church of Sweden was the national
church until it was officially separated from the state in January
215. See, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, at httpJ/www.un.org/womenwatch/
daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004) (summarizing the Convention's focus on
providing equal rights to all women through engaging the involvement of members of the
private and public sector including tribunals, legal systems, enterprises, and organizations).
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. Richard F Tomasson, How Sweden Became so Secular, 74 SCANDINAVIAN STuD. 6188
(2002), 2002 WL 23105664.
219. Id at 14 (approximating that 700 or 20 percent of the priests were women and had
been ordained since 1960).
220. Id. At 14-15 (discussing the Church of Sweden's ability to foster community-wide
participation in the church and not leave traditionally decided matter of the church solely to
the clergy).
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2000.221 According to Tomasson, by the second half of the 1950's the
media, public opinion, and the state were almost unanimous in
support of women's ordination, but the vast majority of the clergy
were opposed to it.222 Notwithstanding this opposition, in 1960 the
first women were ordained to the priesthood in Sweden, and by the
end of the century, most of the male clergy came to terms with the
new order.22 Thus, if women's rights to equality are prioritized, and
if integration between religion and the state makes the state more
willing to intervene in order to ensure equality, then integration
between religion and the state is not necessarily bad for
women's rights.
B. Universalism and Particularism in Women's Rights
A deep-seated problem for women's rights is their susceptibility
to particularism. This susceptibility is evident in both Israel and the
United States. The tension between Israel's nature as a Jewish
state and its nature as a democratic state can be characterized as an
inherent tension between particularism and universalism.224
Constitutional law scholar Mark Tushnet argues that this tension
is by no means unique to Israel and is in fact an inherent tension in
nation-state based constitutionalism in general.225 Tushnet suggests
that most nation-states with constitutions commit themselves both
to universal propositions, such as human rights, and to propositions
about the particular character of the nation, and that what is
distinctive in the Israeli case is that the tension between universalism
and particularism has been completely out in the open for such a
long time.228
Following this observation, I would argue that perhaps there is
no area in which the tension between the universal and the
particular is more evident than the area of women's rights, as
illustrated by the large number of substantive reservations to
CEDAW.227 The particular nature of Israel's attitude towards
221. Id. at 14.
222. Id. at 15 (estimating that eighty-five percent of the clergy were opposed to the
ordination of women as priests in 1957).
223. Id. at 15.
224. See Pnina Lahav, A 'Jewish State... to Be Known as the State of Israel": Notes on
Israeli Legal Historiography, 19 LAW & HIST. REv. 387,417-19 (2001) (inquiring whether the
tension is a reflection of Israel's uniqueness or of its struggle to be a modern nation).
225. Mark Tushnet, The Universal and the Particular in Constitutional Law: An Israeli
Case Study, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1327, 1337 (2000) (reviewing PNiNA LAHAv, JUDGEMENT IN
JERUSALEM: CHIEF JUSTICE SIMON AGRANAT AND THE ZIONIST CENTURY (1997).
226. Id. at 1337.
227. Minor, supra note 20, at 144 (noting that reservations which essentially modify or
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women's rights is evident from its substantive reservations to the
Convention. Based on religious grounds, Israel reserved from
CEDAW's Articles 7 and 16." The discriminatory nature of various
religious family laws, which are the national law in Israel, caused
for Israel's reservation to CEDAW's Article 16 on equality in
marriage and in the family.2" Israel's reservation to CEDAW's
Article 7, addressing equality in political and public life, arose due
to Israel's discrimination against women in appointments to
religious state institutions such as religious courts."0
The United State's attitude towards women's rights is evident
from its outright refusal to join CEDAW and from the nature of the
reservations suggested by the United States government in the
event a decision tojoin CEDAW is eventually made. 1 The American
refusal to join CEDAW stems from the significant discrepancy
between the extensive protection granted in CEDAW to women's
right to equality and the clear preference given in the United States
Constitution, and especially in the judicial interpretation of the
Constitution, to rights whose protection curtails the advancement
of women's right to equality."2 The United States' refusal to
contemplate any changes to the scope of the rights enumerated in
the Constitution is at the core of its refusal to join CEDAW.233 For
this reason, one of the reservations suggested by the United States
government in the event the United States joins CEDAW plainly
states that "[the US does not accept any obligation to enact
legislation or to take any other action with respect to private
conduct except as mandated by the Constitution and laws of the
United States." 4
The assumption that such particular norms can and should
have priority over universal norms, in the area of women's rights is
exclude certain provisions of the Convention from applying to a state, have been made by at
least twenty-five parties); Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination
of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INTL L. 643, 644 (1990) (discussing
how reservations dilute the Convention's impact).
228. Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 152, at 345.
229. See supra part II(B) and especially notes 149-182 and accompanying text.
230. See supra part II(B) and especially notes 185-198 and accompanying text.
231. See Minor, supra note 20, at 146-48 (illustrating how proposed reservations would
make a mockery of the Convention's impact in the United States); Mayer, supra note 122, at
820 (arguing that the United States hides behind the Constitution on women's rights issues
when providing rationales for not joining the Convention because of a fear that the legal
system's more lenient standard for sex discrimination as compared to racial discrimination
would be criticized).
232. Mayer, supra note 121, at 768.
233. Id. at 820.
234. Id. at 800.
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at the heart of the difficulty in achieving equality for women. In
Israel, the particular norms obstructing the achievement of equality
for women are rooted in the Jewish religion;25 in the United States,
however, the norms obstructing the achievement of women's equality
are rooted, ironically, in the Constitution and its jurisprudence.2 The
reverence accorded to the Constitution's scheme of protection of civil
liberties, which puts an inordinately high weight on freedom of
religion, expression and association, but awkwardly incorporates
women's right to equality through an amendment which gives only
"male citizens" the right to vote 7 , obstructs attempts to reform the
defense of women's rights and make it more appropriate to this day
and age.2 8
Thus, the "religion" of the Constitution plays a very similar role
in the United States to the role the Orthodox Jewish religion fulfills
in Israel as far as women's rights are concerned.2 9 On its face this
result seems paradoxical; after all, the consequences of a
constitution protecting religious liberty and the separation between
religion and the state should be diametrically opposed to the
consequences of a regime of partial integration between religion and
the state. Nevertheless, this result is in fact highly logical because
both value the good of the majority at the expense of burdening the
minority. The American Constitution, as it is currently interpreted,
is committed to ensuring the flourishing of religious and civic
communities and to allowing them to advance and protect their
unique way of life, even when this way of life is based on
discrimination and exclusion of both members and non members.
Similarly, the incorporation of religious family laws into the state
legislation in Israel is aimed at ensuring that the various religious
235. Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 152, at 345.
236. Mayer, supra note 121, at 800-803.
237. See U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 2. But see U.S. CONST. amend X1V, § 1. (Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment contains the equal protection clause which was extended to
include women's right to equality only in 1971); see also Reed v. Reed 404 U.S. 71 (1971)(using
the equal protection clause to strike an Idaho statute that preferred men over women as an
administrator of an estate).
238. Becker, supra note 76, at 454 (arguing that the provisions in the Bill of Rights
perpetuate the disparity in treatment of men and women, often overlooking many problems
that women face and allowing the provisions to be differently applied to women than to men);
Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1657, 1676 (1997) (arguing
that not only does the system of constitutional guarantees of negative liberties "fail s] as a
sword in the hands of women, it operates as a shield to patriarchy"). See also infra part II(F).
239. For an illuminating discussion of the "religion" of the Constitution, see Mayer, supra
note 121, at 741-44. (likening the treatment of the Constitution more to "a holy relic than a
secular document laying out a scheme of government").
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communities flourish ultimately enabling them to advance and
protect their unique, albeit often discriminatory, ways of life.
Just as the practical result of incorporating religious law
into the civil law in Israel is that religious discrimination persists,
so the practical result of the United States' "hands off religion and
community" approach is that religious and other private discrimination
persists. While a qualitative difference exists between the Israeli
transformation of religious law into national law and the American
non-intervention in religion and community, it is important to
remember a most valuable feminist insight, there is no such thing
as state non-intervention.2" Both state action and state inaction are
a form of intervention and the choice to "deregulate" religion and
community is as deeply constitutive of them as the choice to
regulate them.24'
C. Shielding Separation and Equality Enhancing Separation
Due to the patriarchal nature of religion, a regime of separation
between religion and the state seems a much more congenial
starting point for the achievement of equality for women. For such
a regime to be truly congenial to women's rights, it needs to be quite
different from the current regime of separation between religion and
the state in the United States. First Amendment scholars offer two
different readings of the motivation behind the religion clauses of
the Constitution. According to Michael McConnell, the ideal of the
religion clauses is "that they guarantee a pluralistic republic in
which citizens are free to exercise their religious differences without
hindrance from the state."242 The underlying principle of these
clauses is, in his opinion, "that governmental action should have the
minimum possible effect on religion, consistent with achievement of
the government's legitimate purposes."243 I term separation between
religion and the state that is motivated solely by the desire to enable
the "unimpaired flourishing" of religion2' and which therefore gives
240. See, eg., Susan H. Williams, A Feminist Reassessment of Civil Society, 72 IND. L. J.
417, 421 (1997) (arguing that a state's decision to refrain from regulating can have as much,
if not more of an impact, than its decision to regulate).
241. Id. The classic example is that of marital rape. Although in the past state refusal to
criminalize marital rape has been considered state non-intervention in the family, today it is
indisputable that whether the state decides to criminalize marital rape or refuses to do so its
decision is a form of intervention in the family and has a crucial impact on the power relations
between the spouses. Id.
242. Michael McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115,
168(1992).
243. Id at 169.
244. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 29, at 1254-56 (claiming that the principle of
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the highest priority to the principle of non-intervention in religious
affairs, "shielding separation."
An altogether different motivation for the separation between
religion and the state is offered by Kathleen Sullivan. According to
Sullivan, the motivation behind the religion clauses "is not
unfettered religious liberty, but rather religious liberty insofar as
it is consistent with the establishment of the secular public moral
order," that is the culture of liberal democracy.""' As a result, to
exclude religion from public programs is not invidious discrimination
against religion; instead secular governance of public affairs is a
requirement of the establishment clause.2
While Sullivan's view of the restrictive nature of the
establishment clause differs considerably from McConnell's view of
the establishment clause as ensuring the unimpaired flourishing of
religion, their views on the free exercise clause are quite similar.
Like McConnell, Sullivan believes the free exercise clause should be
read broadly, to allow religious exemptions from laws of general
applicability. 2 7 Thus, she believes that Reynolds v. United States,
which denied Mormons an exemption from a criminal ban on
polygamy, was wrong;' that the exclusion of women from
priesthood by Roman Catholic and some Protestant churches should
be allowed as part of the organizational autonomy that is a price of
free exercise;24s and that religious schools should be free to inculcate
in children the belief in the natural subordination of women to
men."0 For Sullivan, "[tihe privatization of religion reconciles the
two Religion Clauses."25 ' The detrimental consequences to religion
caused by the restrictive nature of the Establishment Clause are
offset by the shielding nature of the free exercise clause. 2
Although I agree that the free exercise clause should be read
broadly to support religious liberty generally, I believe that the
Constitution contains nothing allowing the reading of the Free
unimpaired flourishing represents what they term the "privilege view of religious freedom"
because it "regard[s] state interference with the observance of religious commandments as a
constitutional vice that the state must avoid whenever it can do so without imperiling its most
basic goals and obligations").
245. Sullivan, supra note 22, at 198.
246. Id. at 198-99.
247. Id. at 220. Where Sullivan parts company with McConnell is in her refusal to allow
exemptions on religious grounds from redistributive programs of the welfare state such as
social security taxes. Id.
248. Id. at 219.
249. Id. at 220; 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878).
250. Sullivan, supra note 22, at 220.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 205.
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Exercise Clause as supporting religious practices that inculcate and
maintain the subordination of women. Explicit in the assumption
that the Free Exercise Clause protects religious practices that
discriminate against women is the assumption that the promotion
of religiously motivated ideas regarding the subordination of women
is consistent with the establishment of the secular public moral
order and with the culture of liberal democracy. My contention is
that this assumption is inconsistent with the liberal democratic
commitment to equality as a fundamental value and undermines
the morality of the secular public moral order. I therefore would
suggest an additional motivation for the separation between religion
and the state, which is to counteract the patriarchal and
hierarchical nature inherent in many major religions and to ensure
that the liberal premise and promise of equality for all is not
undermined by the effects such organized private discrimination has
on people's lives and on the formation of citizens. 53 Thus, I would
argue for a model of separation between religion and the state which
I term "equality enhancing separation" and which is aimed at
enhancing the equality of subordinated groups, especially women,
who have suffered the most profound and enduring discrimination
on the basis of religious precepts.'
The centrality of equality as a fundamental concern shaping the
relationship between religion and the state has become more
pronounced in recent years. Noah Feldman argues that the
underlying principle of the Court's current Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is the protection of religious minorities' political
equality."5 Subsequently, he questions whether there is anything
unique about religious minorities that entitles them to more
equality protection than other minority groups and posits that
no justification for such special protection can be found. 6 The
Court's most recent Free Exercise decisions, Smith"s7 and the
253. For a discussion on the dependence of liberalism upon private institutions such as
religion for the formation of good citizens see e.g., McConnell, supra note 23, at 1256.
254. See generally MATILDA JOSLIN GAGE, WOMAN, CHURCH AND STATE (Sally Roesch
Wagner ed., Humanity Books 2002) (1893); GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PAmIARCHY,
chs. 8-11 (1986), ROSEMARY RADFORD RUETHER, SEXISM AND GOD TALK (2d ed. 1993). Another
group that has suffered a similar depth of discrimination are gays and lesbians whose
discrimination is also based on sex and sexuality. See generally DAVID A. J. RICHARDS,
IDENTITY AND THE CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS, RACE, GENDER, RELIGION AS ANALOGIES, 110-
28 (1999).
255. Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment
Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 673, 673 (2002).
256. Id. at 712-718.
257. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that Oregon's law
prohibiting peyote use was constitutional and employer's did not violate the Free
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Church of Lukumi Babalu," can also be read as prioritizing
equality considerations. Thus, for example, Justice Blackmun, who
wrote separately in the Church ofLukumi Babalu case, argued that
the majority in Lukumi Babalu was wrong to apply the test
announced in the Smith decision.25 9 According to Blackmun, Smith
"treated the Free Exercise Clause as no more than an
antidiscrimination principle."2 °
Equality considerations have similarly been used by scholars to
interpret the religion clauses and to attack or endorse the Court's
interpretation of them. Eisgruber and Sager, whose approach to the
religion clauses is discussed below, base their model of the
protection of religion on equality considerations and conclude that
religious groups are entitled to protection against discrimination,
but not to any special privileges that are not accorded to other
groups.261 Similarly, McConnell and Sullivan attack the Supreme
Court's narrow interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause in Smith
on the basis of its discriminatory impact on minority religions.262 As
both Sullivan and McConnell observe, mainstream religions do not
need the Court to protect their religious practices against neutral
and valid laws, because the legislature likely has made sure that
the laws do not conflict with these practices.2" Minority religions
are the only ones that are at a risk of having their practices conflict
with neutral and valid laws.2" Consequently, the exclusion of
religious practices that conflict with valid and neutral laws from the
scope of the Free Exercise Clause results in discrimination against
minority religions.2
An application of this observation to religious practices that
discriminate against women leads to interesting results. Because
the natural subordination of women to men is a central tenet of
most mainstream religions, the secular public moral order
unquestioningly accepts the claim that the right to free exercise of
Exercise Clause when firing employees for using the drug and subsequently denying
employment compensation).
258. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)(Blackmun,
J. concurring in judgement) (holding that the city's ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifice was
motivated by animosity toward the Santeria religion and therefore violated the Free Exercise
Clause).
259. Id. at 578.
260. Id.
261. Eisgruber and Sager supra note 29, at 1278, 1283.
262. Sullivan, supra note 22, at 216; McConnell, supra note 242, at 139.
263. Sullivan, supra note 22, at 216; McConnell, supra note 242, at 139.
264. McConnell, supra note 242, at 139 (arguing that mainstream religions can more easily
protect themselves from government intervention than foreign, unpopular religions).
265. Sullivan, supra note 22, at 216; McConnell, supra note 242, at 139.
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religion entails the right to preach and practice the subordination
of women. Nevertheless, nothing is inherent in religiously motivated
subordination of women, that makes it more deserving of protection
than, for example, the ingestion of peyote for sacramental purposes.
Quite to the contrary, while arguably the ingestion of peyote during
a religious ceremony does not cause harm to anyone, 266 the
religiously motivated preaching and practice of the subordination of
women likely causes significant harm to many women; both those
who are members of the subordinating religions and those who are
not.2 67 Thus, while the equality enhancing model of separation
between religion and the state would support the recognition of a
free exercise right to ingest peyote for sacramental purposes as
enhancing the equality of a minority religion without causing any
undue harm, it will reject the right of religions to freely exercise
discrimination against women. This is because the model of equality
enhancing separation does not recognize the right of religions to
discriminate against their members and calls on the state not to
give religions any exemptions from generally applicable anti
discrimination legislation.
D. The Free Exercise of Discrimination in Leadership Positions
Contrary to McConnell, who argues that the First Amendment
privileges religion and mandates the unimpaired flourishing of
religion, 2' Eisgruber and Sager argue that the First Amendment
should not be understood as privileging religion above all other
human endeavors but as offering religion protection from
discrimination.2 9 According to Eisengruber and Sager, no justifiable
ground exists for privileging religion in relation to other
266. McConnell, supra note 242, at 138 (noting that the Court in Smith lacked evidence
that peyote was harmful).
267. Thus, for example, Sullivan concedes that "when the Roman Catholic and some
Protestant churches exclude women from the priesthood, they powerfully and visibly reinforce
a social hierarchy rejected in the civil order." Sullivan, supra note 22, at 220. See also Becker,
supra note 76, at 459-469, 474-479 (arguing that the subordination of females in religion
makes women think, among other things, that they are incapable of leadership and unworthy
of influence in religious roles in their culture and society). The harm caused to all American
women by the defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment and by restrictions on abortions, two
issues on which religious fundamentalists have enormous influence, cannot be dismissed
lightly. Id. 474-79 (referencing a study that found a correlation between church attendance
and opposition to the ERA and abortion). See also Mayer, supra note 121, at 770-71 (arguing
that the ERA's defeat came from religions and conservative opposition groups' ability to frame
the ERA as something that would threaten values and morals).
268. See McConnell, supra note 242.
269. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 29, at 1248.
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conscientious matters in a plural democratic society. ° They argue
that even if one were to accept the contention that religion enjoyed
a privileged position before Reconstruction, the Fourteenth
Amendment has effectively equalized religion and non-religion,
among other things, and has virtually deprived religion of any
privileged status it might have originally enjoyed.271 Instead,
religion is entitled to constitutional protection (as opposed to
privilege) because of the vulnerability of religion to prejudice and
persecution.272 Eisgruber and Sager offer a new approach to
religious exemptions, which they term "equal regard".27' The equal
regard approach requires "that government treat the deep,
religiously inspired concerns of minority religious believers with the
same regard as that enjoyed by the deep concerns of citizens
generally."2 74 While the idea of equal regard requires the state to
respect the religious believer's contention as to the importance of
the relevant religious norm in her life, it does not require the state
to accept the religious believer's judgment that her religious
interests are weightier than the secular interests of the state. 5
Thus, just like any other deep interests of individuals, religious
interests figure into the secular concerns of the state but they
cannot override them.276
Eisgruber's and Sager's model of equal regard for religion on
the basis of its vulnerability to discrimination and its need for
protection seems to be particularly conducive to justifying the need
for intervention in religious practices and norms in order to protect
women's right to equality. After all, the most obvious outcome of a
model that argues that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment restricts the scope of the right to religious
freedom as guaranteed in the First Amendment 277 should be that
freedom of religion couldn't justify discrimination on the basis of
race and sex.278 If religious freedom is not privileged in any way,
then there can be no justification for allowing religions to
discriminate on the basis of race or sex in their own ministerial
positions. Nevertheless, in order to avoid this outcome, Eisgruber
270. Id. at 1263.
271. Id. at 1271-1272.
272. Id. at 1278.
273. Id. at 1283.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1286.
276. Id.
277. See id. at 1271-72.
278. This is especially true regarding race, which is the raison d'atre of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
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and Sager draw an inaccurate and misleading parallel between
allowing religions to discriminate in their choice of leaders
and allowing an individual to choose her psychiatrist. According
to Eisgruber and Sager "[Rieligious leaders are moral advisors,
confidants, friends and spiritual guides. The state cannot prescribe
a nondiscriminatory protocol for a group's choice of a person who
is to bear this private responsibility to its members any more
than the state could prescribe such a protocol for the selection of a
psychiatrist, or of a neighbor in whom to confide one's hopes
and concerns."27 9
Thus, the general right to privacy and freedom of choice and not
religious freedom justifies allowing religions to discriminate on the
basis of sex and race in the choice of leaders.80
This comparison is flawed and demonstrates nicely how dictates
by group leaders are masked as individual choices, which in turn
serves as justification for discrimination. While an individual has
the right to decide that she wants to consult a psychiatrist of a
certain sex or race and then choose her psychiatrist accordingly, this
situation is a far cry from a situation in which an organized religion
decides, as a matter of policy, not to allow women to serve in
leadership roles. In the former case the individual directly affected
by the choice is the one making it for herself and not for others. In
the latter case, the choice of the spiritual guide's sex was done by
others in advance and if anything the choice of the individual
receiving the counseling, as well as her privacy, is restricted by the
will of others. This restriction becomes evident when thinking about
the unease that many women, in religious communities with only
men as spiritual leaders, experience when they need to confide in a
person from the opposite sex on intimate matters. This argument
does not state that people cannot successfully confide in spiritual
advisors from the opposite sex, this argument only proffers that
dictates such as the ones hailed by Eisgruber and Sager as
enhancements of individual privacy and choice are in fact
restrictions on individual privacy and choice, because group dictates
are not an appropriate substitute for individual choice. Viewed in
this light, Eisgruber and Sager's comparison between individual
choice and the dictates of the group becomes exceedingly
questionable.
279. Id. at 1276.
280. Id. ("The aspects of religious practice that are uncontroversially secure from the reach
of some state commands are so secure because they are private in general and recognizable
ways, not because they are religious.").
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The fact that an individual is free to choose her psychiatrist on
the basis of her sex and race does not confer the right to the
organization employing the psychiatrists to choose its employees on
the basis of their sex or race.281 Similarly, a community that decides
to open a counseling center for its members cannot choose to hire
only counselors of a certain sex or race in anticipation of its
members' alleged preferences.282 Thus, Eisgruber's and Sager's
claim that the right of an organized religion to discriminate on the
basis of race and sex in the choice of spiritual leaders is
"uncontroversially secure from the reach of [ I state commands"
because it is "private in general and recognizable ways", and not
because it is religious,m is misguided. To allow religions to
discriminate on the basis of sex and race in the choice of spiritual
leaders is incompatible with the equal regard model because it
privileges religion over non religion and because the equal regard
model is based, inter alia, on the claim that the Equal Protection
Clause restricts religious freedom on the basis of equality
considerations. 2s Accordingly, the model should reflect the fact that
the Equal Protection Clause forbids discrimination on the bases of
race and sex.
Furthermore, in reconciling their claim that religion should not
be privileged over non-religion with their desire to accord religious
organizations the right to be free of government regulation in the
selection of their members and their leaders, Eisgruber and Sager
argue that all associations that constitute communities, both
religious and non-religious, should enjoy a unique right to privacy,
which and should therefore not be subject to governmental scrutiny
of their membership or leadership decisions.' Thus, Eisgruber and
Sager make the same claim that the United States Supreme Court
281. While customers have and exercise discriminatory preferences, there is a prohibition
on employers' discrimination on the basis of such preferences. See, e.g. Diaz v. Pan American
World Airways, 442 F. 2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
282. Id.
283. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 29, at 1276.
284. Id. at 1297-98.
285. Id. at 1311-12. Eisgruber and Sager define associations that constitute communities
as those associations that have private goals such as intimacy, shared understanding, self-
expression, personal growth, and philosophical edification, as opposed to associations that
have public goals such as commercial prosperity or political power. Id. at 1312. According to
Eisgruber and Sager, only associations that constitute communities, such as churches, should
be exempt from government scrutiny of their membership or leadership decisions. Id. at 1313.
However, Eisgruber and Sager's characterization of churches as the typical private
associations, despite the expressly political agendas of many churches, exposes the incoherent
nature of this distinction. Id.
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recently made in the Boy Scouts case," stating that communities
serve as a shield against the application of anti-discrimination law.
Ironically, Eisgruber's and Sager's motivating concern, to establish
equality between religion and non-religion, arguably ends up
establishing a right to free exercise of discrimination on the basis of
sex and race. The Court in the Boy Scouts case based the right to
free exercise of discrimination in leadership positions on the right
to expressive association, which it derived from the first
amendment. Eisgruber and Sager base the right to free exercise of
discrimination on a right to private association, which is based on
the right to intimate association as defined by the Court in Roberts
v. United States Jaycees."2A The distinction between the right to
expressive association and the right to intimate association and the
correct application of the right to intimate association to religious
associations can help us sketch what in my view should be the
proper scope of the right of religious associations to discriminate in
membership and leadership positions.m
The right to expressive association derives from the First
Amendment. "'[Ilmplicit in the right to engage in activities protected
by the First Amendment' is 'a corresponding right to associate with
others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic,
educational, religious, and cultural ends." 9 On the basis of this
right, the Supreme Court held that an expressive association, i.e.
an association that "engage [s] in some form of expression, whether
be it public or private," had the right to discriminate against a
person and refuse to accept him as a member, or in a position of
leadership, if "that person affects in a significant way the group's
ability to advocate public or private viewpoints". 21' Consequently,
the Court held that the application of New Jersey's public
accommodations law, which forbids discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation in public accommodations to an organization such
as the Boy Scouts would violate their freedom of expressive
association, because it would significantly burden the organization's
right to oppose homosexuality. 29'
286. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
287. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 29, at 1312 (discussing Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984)).
288. For an illuminating discussion of the distinction between the right to expressive
association and the right to intimate association see Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's
Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 810-11 (2001).
289. Boy Scouts of America, 120 S. Ct., at 2451 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984)).
290. Boy Scouts of America, 120 S. Ct., at 2451.
291. Id. at 2457.
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In contrast, the right of "intimate association" is derived from
the right to privacy, and is designed to protect highly personal
relationships from unjustified interference by the state.292 The right
to intimate association protects an individual's right to choose her
spouse, her friends and her spiritual counselor.293 This right can also
be extended to small groups that maintain intimate relationships
between their members. 4 The factors that may be relevant to a
decision whether the group qualifies as an intimate association
"include size, purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality, and other
characteristics that in a particular case may be pertinent."29 In
Roberts the Court found that the Jaycees did not qualify as an
intimate association because their local chapters were large and
basically unselective groups.29 Similarly, in Boy Scouts the Court
affirmed the New Jersey Supreme Court's finding that the Boy
Scouts were not an intimate association, because of the size of the
organization and because the troops were unselective in their
membership despite the fact that some of their troops consisted of
as little as fifteen scouts.297
Eisgruber and Sager contend that a church's autonomy in the
selection of its leaders and members can be defended on the basis of
the right to intimate association. 29' This conclusion constitutes an
unwarranted extension of the right to intimate association. At most,
the right to intimate association can protect the right of a specific
congregation to choose its own leaders, if the congregation meets the
conditions set out in the Court's opinions, such as small size and
selectivity of members, and if the choice of leader is left to the
congregation itself and not dictated by the central church
authorities. Accordingly, the right to intimate association cannot
protect the right of a church with tens or hundreds of thousands of
members to decide that its leadership should consist only of men. In
fact, a decision of church authorities compelling all congregations to
accept only men as leaders, regardless of the congregation's
preference, is inimical to the congregation's right of intimate
292. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
293. See Id.
294. Id. (stating that as a general matter, relationships possessing such qualities as
sharing a special community of thoughts, or a high degree of selectivity to either begin or
maintain the interaction are afforded Constitutional protection from unjustified state
interference).
295. Id.
296. Id. at 621.
297. Boy Scouts, 120 S. Ct., at 2450; Dale v. Boy Scouts of America 734 A. 2d. 1196, 1221-
22 (N.J., 1999).
298. Eisgruber and Sager, supra note 29, at 1312-1313 (arguing that church selection of
members and leadership is analogous to personal choices about guests and friends).
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association because it restricts the congregation's right to choose
rather than respecting it.
Of course, following the Supreme Court's holding in Boy Scouts,
the right of both religious and non-religious associations to choose
their members and leaders can be defended as part of the right
to expressive association. 99 As discussed in Part II of this article,
even prior to the Boy Scouts holding, the lower courts found that
the right of religious associations to choose their members and
leaders was protected by the free exercise clause. Nevertheless, I
would like to suggest that the right to discriminate in membership
and leadership positions should be restricted to situations of
intimate associations, and the right to free exercise of
discrimination granted to religious and non religious organizations
is overbroad. With regard to the right to free exercise of
discrimination granted expressive associations I agree with Jed
Rubenfeld who argues in his critique of Boy Scouts that the First
Amendment is not intended to create exemptions from conduct laws
of general applicability for persons who want to engage in the
prohibited conduct for expressive purposes.3" Rubenfeld compares
the Boy Scout's request for an exemption from a generally
applicable anti-discrimination law to a request by tax protestors to
receive an exemption from paying taxes on the grounds that they
are communicating a message by refusing to pay their taxes."°' Just
as tax protestors would not receive an exemption from paying their
taxes on the grounds that forcing them to pay the taxes would
interfere with their intended message or would even appear as
though they were supporting the government, so an organization
such as the Boy Scouts should not receive an exemption from
generally applicable anti-discrimination laws merely because it is
trying to convey a message supporting discrimination.3 2 As
Rubenfeld aptly describes, "Provided that the law's purpose is to
target doing rather than speaking, and provided that the law is not
selectively enforced to target speech, individuals do not obtain a
First Amendment 'pass' from generally applicable conduct laws just
because they want to break the law for expressive reasons."303
299. Boy Scouts, 120 S.Ct. at 2449 (holding that the Boy Scouts of America could revoke
membership of one of its members because his activism for gay rights as well as being a
homosexual was inconsistent with the values the organization promoted and instilled in its
members).
300. Rubenfeld, supra note 288, at 808.
301. Id. at 809.
302. Id.
303. Id.
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As to the right to free exercise of discrimination granted to
religious institutions I would argue that following Smith and The
Church of Lukumi Babalu decisions and considering the strong
emphasis on equality considerations as determinative of the scope
of the Free Exercise Clause, this clause should not be read as
exempting religious associations from generally applicable anti-
discrimination legislation such as Title VII.3 1 Instead, the right to
discriminate should be restricted strictly to situations of intimate
association, whether of a religious or of a non religious nature.
Thus, while a small congregation may have the right to take sex or
race into account when choosing a pastor with which the members
would have an intimate relationship, a church should not be allowed
to adopt a general policy of discrimination on the basis of a
prohibited classification; even where such a policy is seemingly
based on religious tenets. A church adopting a discriminatory policy
should be regarded in violation of Title VII. Courts should scrutinize
discrimination complaints to ensure that if discrimination in the
choice of pastor does occur, it does so within the boundaries
protected by the right of intimate association, not due to a general
policy of a religious association or for any other forbidden reasons.
Any other form of discrimination on a prohibited basis that occurs
within a religious association, such as discrimination against
employees in other positions or discrimination in benefits, should be
forbidden in religious associations, just as it is forbidden in non
religious associations.0 5 One might object that such a scheme of
monitoring discrimination within religious institutions would create
severe problems of entanglement. With the proliferation of voucher
programs and faith based initiatives, however, it seems that the
borders of permissible entanglement have expanded considerably.
It is difficult to imagine a more serious entanglement of government
and religion than the one recently approved by the Supreme Court
304. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, et seq. (2000).
305. This is not the place to discuss the right of religious institutions to discriminate in
leadership positions and membership on the basis of religious affiliation except to say that
this right is broader than the right to discriminate on bases such as race and sex and that
perhaps it should correspond to the First Amendment right an expressive association has to
refuse to accept someone who does not subscribe to the association's ideology as a member or
a leader. See Rubenfeld, supra note 288 at 815. ("Individuals and associations have no First
Amendment right to discriminate on grounds of race, sex, and so on; but they may have a
First Amendment right to 'discriminate' against people who refuse to support their ideological
agendas"). Even this right to discriminate based on lack of support of an organization's
idealogical agenda is subject to limitations. Thus, while a church can refuse to accept as a
member a person who does not share the church's faith, its right to refuse employment to such
a person should be much more restricted.
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in Zelman. °6 In Zelman, the Ohio voucher program stipulated that
the religious schools accepting the vouchers would be barred from
teaching "hatred of any person or group on the basis of race,
ethnicity, national origin, or religion.""' If the state can monitor the
content of religious teaching in order to prevent the teaching of
hatred, then arguably no reason exists why it should not be able to
inquire into a discrimination complaint against a religious
association, especially in light of the fact that the resolution of the
complaint should be made without regard to the religious tenets of
the association.
V. EQUALITY OR COMMUNITY OR EQUALITY WITHIN COMMUNITY
Thus far, I have described the United States model of separation
between religion and the state and the Israeli model of partial
integration between religion and the state and argued that neither
suffices to ensure equality for women. I further argued that as a
matter of law the right to free exercise of discrimination granted
religious and non-religious associations is incompatible with the
central role the right to equality plays in the Constitution and in
determining the scope of the Religion Clauses. I will now turn to
refuting the claim that underlies the right to free exercise of
discrimination, namely, that there is no need to ensure equality
within the community. This claim is based on the assumption that
the right of exit serves as a proper substitute for the right to
equality."' I will argue that the right of exit does not serve as a
proper substitute for equality because exiting a constitutive
community is extremely difficult for any member of the community,
and particularly for oppressed members such as women. Analyzing
women's agency under patriarchy, I will argue that it is wrong to
assume that women who remain in oppressive conditions which they
cannot escape are freely consenting to their oppression. I will
further argue that the persistence of inequality and oppression in
the private sphere threatens the legitimacy of the democratic
process, which is predicated on the participation of free and equal
citizens. Consequently, a state committed to equality has a duty to
intervene in the private sphere in order to change oppressive
306. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002). (For a discussion on the problem
of entanglement see especially Justice Breyer's dissent).
307. Id. At 2505 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(A) (6)),
308. Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 508 (2001)(arguing that
cultural dissenters have the power to leave a cultural group).
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conditions." 9 Additionally, a state has a duty to avoid entrenching
oppression by protecting the right to free exercise of discrimination
and by silencing "cultural dissent". 10 Finally, I will discuss the
education of schoolchildren in conservative religious communities
as epitomizing the vulnerability of community members and the
opportunity and duty of the liberal democratic state to intervene in
such communities in order to promote equality.
A. The Involuntary Nature of Religion and Community
Nancy Rosenblum posits that in American political thought,
religious associations are viewed as the "quintessential voluntary
association."' She points to people changing their religion and to
open and aggressive competition for believers as proof of the
voluntary nature of religion.3 2Although these phenomena point to
the fact that certain people are willing and able to change their
religion, they in no way entail the proposition that religious
associations are purely voluntary associations. In fact, many aspects
of religious associations call into question their characterization as
the quintessential voluntary association.1 The hierarchical nature
of most religions, the all-encompassing nature of many religious
communities, the centrality of religion in the lives of the faithful and
the fact that most people remain faithful to the religious
denomination in which they were raised31' are ample reasons to
suspect that the power that religious communities exercise over
their members is much stronger than American political thought is
willing to admit. For example, Mary Becker provides statistics that
show that between seventy to ninety percent of those who received
religious training as children remained committed to the same
religious denomination as adults.3" As she observes, children are
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. NANCYL. ROSENBLuM, MEMBERSHnPAND MORALS, THE PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM
IN AMERICA 73 (1998) (arguing that the United States should encourage more freedom of
association to cultivate social trust among members of society).
312. Id. ("Nothing could underscore the voluntarism of religious associations more than
the open and aggressive competition for believers that characterizes religion in the United
States." Id.).
313. Id. at 73.
314. See The Politics of Women's Wrongs, supra note 78, at 477.
315. Id. According to Becker, "ninety-one percent of those 'raised as Baptists say [that] they
are Baptists today.' For Episcopalians, the figure is ninety percent; for Lutherans, eighty-nine
percent; for Methodists, seventy-four percent; for Presbyterians, seventy-two percent; for
Catholics eighty-one percent; for Jews eighty-six percent; for those with no religion forty-four
percent." Id. (citing Public Opinion Report: America Land of the Faithful 96, no. 101(1990)).
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not born with religious commitments, rather they are socialized into
them by their parents and by their parents' religious communities." 6
If parents successfully socialize their children into their religion
then the assumption that most people choose their religion, as
autonomous adults is simply wrong.31 7 This would not be cause for
concern except for the fact that the principle of government non-
intervention in religious associations is based on the allegedly
voluntary nature of these associations.318 Because, as Nancy
Rosenblum puts it "[how people arrive at their beliefs is a matter of
indifference," 9 it is easy to assume that they do so voluntarily and
that at any given moment, any member of a religious community can
simply walk out on her beliefs and on her community.
This attitude towards religious associations exposes a deep-
seated contradiction in contemporary liberal thought. On the one
hand, religious associations are "the quintessential voluntary
association"32 , on the other hand, to quote Rawls:
It can happen that in their personal affairs, or in the internal
life of associations, citizens may regard their final ends and
attachments very differently from the way the political
conception supposes. They may have, and often do have at any
given time, affections, devotions, and loyalties that they believe
they would not, indeed could and should not, stand apart from
and evaluate objectively. They may regard it as simply
unthinkable to view themselves apart from certain religious,
philosophical, and moral convictions, or from certain enduring
attachments and loyalties.
If citizens find it impossible to stand apart from their religious,
philosophical, and moral convictions, the manner by which they
have arrived at those convictions should concern the state, and the
view that religious associations are the quintessential voluntary
associations should be re-examined. Apparently, Rawls does
not agree, "Whatever comprehensive religious, philosophical, or
moral views we hold are also freely accepted... as free and equal
citizens, whether we affirm these views is regarded as within our
political competence... .321
316. Id. at 477.
317. Id.
318. ROSENBLUM, supra note 311, at 84.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 73.
321. JOHN RAwLs, JusTIcE AS FAIRNESS, A RESTATEMENT, 93 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001)
[hereinafter RAWLS-RESTATEMENT].
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As with other liberals, Rawls uses coercive power and the right
of exit to explain why it is that although the state is obliged to treat
its citizens equally, religious associations are not. According to
Rawls, while members of religious and other associations can easily
leave if they choose to, they can only evade the power of government
by leaving the state.322 However, leaving the state is a grave step
since it involves leaving the society and culture in which one has
been raised and whose history, customs, and conventions one
depends to find one's place in the social world.323 Because "the bonds
of society and culture, of history and social place of origin, begin so
early to shape our life and are normally so strong. . ." one is not free
to accept or reject state authority in a similar manner as one is free
to accept or reject the authority of a religious community. 2'
This explanation is puzzling, to say the least. The same bonds
of society and culture that tie the individual to her state are those
that tie her to her intimate community. In fact it is through her ties
to her community and her religion (if she is a religious person) that
the individual experiences and forms her ties to her state.325 As a
result, it is no less difficult for a person to leave her religious
community than it is for her to leave her state. This is especially
true in the case of all encompassing religious communities, such as
the Amish, that have been accorded the most extensive protection
in American constitutional law. 26 It is patently wrong to suggest
that it is harder for a member of the Amish community to leave the
United States than it is for her to leave her community. Although
the Amish are an exceptionally secluded and all encompassing
religious community,327 they are merely the exception that proves
the rule, that the most significant, identity forming, and hard to
break ties are within one's own close community.
If this is true, then the notion that only the state "with its
political form of government and its law, exercises coercive power"328
becomes fictitious, because absent the real, as opposed to formal,
ability to exit the community, the practices and norms of the
community are as coercive as those of the state and in some ways
322. Id.
323. Id. at 93-94.
324. Id. at 94.
325. But see JEP SPINNER-HALEV, SuRVIVING DIVERSITY: RELIGION AND DEMOCRATIC
CITIZENSIP 50 (2000) (describing a state as mainstream society which may contain some
communities within, but which have other communities outside of it).
326. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)(holding that the state may not force
Amish respondents to send their children to school up to the age of sixteen).
327. Id. at 210.
328. RAWLS RESTATEMENT, supra note 321, at 20.
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even more so. Consider, for example, the case of religious family law
in Israel. The coercive power of discriminatory religious family law
stems primarily from their religious nature and not from their civil
status, and their effect is felt chiefly by the religious citizens of
Israel, especially religious women. Although a non-religious woman
can choose to avoid the discriminatory religious family laws, which
are the law of the land in Israel, by living with her partner without
formal marriage as common law spouses or by signing a binding
marriage contract, a religious woman's only option is to enter into
a religious marriage and accept all the discriminatory consequences
of such a marriage." 9
The reason for this discrepancy is the coercive power of religion
on a religious Israeli woman is much stronger than the coercive
power of the Israeli civil law on the non-religious Israeli woman.3"
In using this example, it is not my intention to diminish the
violation of rights created by the enactment of religious laws as the
laws of the land. Nor is it my intention to contend that a religious
woman does not choose to marry in a religious marriage. My
intention is simply to argue that the coercive power of religious and
cultural communities is, in this context, much stronger than that of
the state. Although all Jewish religious women might choose to
marry in a religious marriage, many of them, if given the choice,
would not choose to be subjected to the discriminatory consequences
that accompany such a marriage and especially its dissolution. It is
exactly this coercive power of the religious community that prevents
religious women from having that chance, and it is this power that
justifies state intervention in order to facilitate equality for women
inside their religious community and not just outside of it.
The liberal perception of the person as a free and autonomous
individual who can exit her community at will without looking back
is extremely ill suited to women's experience. 1 According to Jeff
Spinner-Halev "[pleople need not have their own community provide
them with many different options, since peering into other
communities and the mainstream society to see what they have to
offer will not be hard to do."332 This near frivolous perception of the
right of exit is extremely at odds with the reality of women's lives.
329. Gavison, supra note 143, at 267.
330. Granted, my analysis would have been quite different had the state of Israel chosen
to make it a criminal offense for a couple to live together without a religious marriage. The
coercive powers of the state through its system of criminal laws are indeed unique, and
regimes that enforce religious law through criminal sanctions are especially pernicious.
331. See, e.g., ROSENBLUM, supra note 311.
332. SPINNER-HALEV, supra note 325, at 53.
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For example, Friedman found that one of the main reasons why
ultra-orthodox Jewish women do not leave their community, in
addition to socialization, is that their leaving would jeopardize the
future prospects of their children to successfully integrate in the
ultra-orthodox community."' As already mentioned, it is exactly
those liberals who recognize the high significance of cultural and
communal attachments to individuals, such as Rawls and Spinner-
Halev, who tend to trivialize the difficulty in exiting one's
community. While this tendency is understandable, the easier it is
to exit, the better substitute it is for the need to ensure equality
inside the community. It is inconsistent to argue on the one hand
that religion, culture and community are central to one's identity,
and on the other hand that exiting religious and cultural
associations is a viable option for weaker members of the
community who object to their subordination. Instead, a more
realistic account would recognize that the religious and cultural
community within which people live is as important to the
oppressed as it is to the oppressors, and if anything, it is harder for
the oppressed to leave the community than for the oppressors. As a
result, justice requires the state to pursue equality within the
community and to forbid the powerful members of the community
from using the community as a shield against equality.33 '
B. Women's Agency, Consent to Discrimination, and the Right
of Exit
There has been extensive writing on the connection between
oppressive social conditions and the choices, autonomy and liberty
of members of oppressed groups. Theories of adaptive preferences,
oppressive socialization, and social construction have all been used
to explain the defining role oppressive social conditions play in the
formation of people's preferences and in the circumscription of their
autonomy and liberty. When applied to questions of exit from
oppressive groups and consent to discriminatory practices within
them, each of these theories is important in explaining why it is that
neither women's alleged right of exit, nor their seeming consent to
333. Menahem Friedman, The Honor of the King's Daughter is Outside, in BLESSED ARE
You GOD FOR HAVING MADE ME A WOMAN?: WOMEN IN JUDAISM FROM THE TANACH TO TODAY
189, 205 (David Yoel Ariel et al. eds., 1999) (Hebrew). The fear these women have about the
status of their children stems from the fact that in the ultra-Orthodox society, all marriages
occur via matching a son's or daughter's prospects, and a good match is ruined by his or her
parents' divorce. Id.
334. For an excellent account of how a legal approach siding with the right ofopprssed
members of a culture to dissent can affect cultures see Sunder, supra note 311, at 561-66.
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the discrimination against them, can serve as a justification for
oppression. Similarly, the next section will argue that when applied
to a democratic society in which oppressive conditions prevail, these
theories can explain how a democratic regime that is assumed to be
based on the consent of free and equal persons is crucially hindered
by the persistence of private discrimination and oppression both in
society as a whole and in illiberal enclaves within society.
Social scientist Jon Elster coined the term "adaptive preferences"
to describe the fact that people tend to adjust their aspirations to
their possibilities as a way of reducing cognitive dissonance."s 5 Cass
Sunstein argues that in the context of sex discrimination the
"phenomenon of adaptive preferences.., is especially important, for
it undermines conventional understandings of free choice. "33 Thus,
"[p]rivate preferences are not always autonomous; they are in part
a product of existing social practice, including social pressures and
the absence of opportunities."" 7 Because preferences are a function
of legal rules and social practices, the same rules and practices
"cannot be defended by reference to the preferences without
circularity.""3 8 If women's preferences have been formed against a
background of limited opportunities, the fact that many women are,
or appear to be, content with the status quo cannot serve as a
dispositive argument against social change aimed at expanding
opportunities and eradicating discrimination 39 Respecting adaptive
preferences promotes neither welfare nor autonomy. By reducing
cognitive dissonance, adaptive preference formation serves to
diminish an individual's frustration and envy and can thus be
regarded as welfare-promoting. ° However, adaptive preference
formation also reduces an individual's welfare because, by adjusting
their aspirations to available opportunities, people fail to obtain
goods that would have turned out to be extremely rewarding.41
Furthermore, if the process of adaptive preference formation is an
unconscious one, and the preferences are created as a result of a
lack of opportunities which the individual can't control, then
adaptive preferences are, in an important sense, non-autonomous.342
335. JON ELsrER, SOUR GRAPES, STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY, 109-10 (1983).
336. Cass R. Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory, 101 HARV. L. REV. 826, 836 (1988)
(book review).
337. Id. at 836-37.
338. Id. at 837.
339. Id.
340. Cass Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129,
1147 (1986).
341. Id.
342. Id.
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When applied to questions of exit and consent, it is clear why
the theory of adaptive preferences undermines the reliance on
women's consent to justify oppressive practices and on women's
alleged right of exit to excuse non-intervention in oppressive
communities. If women adapt their preferences to suit the
oppressive community in which they live, then their consent to
discriminatory practices such as women's segregation or mandated
submission has more to do with the fact the community dictates
these practices, than with women's unfettered choice. 3 Further, if
the process of adaptive preference formation is an unconscious
process that is not controlled by the individual, and which is
intended to reduce cognitive dissonance and enable her to make
peace with her circumstances, then its existence greatly reduces the
chances that women (or other oppressed community members)
would utilize the right to exit, which requires the individual to
challenge her unconscious adaptation.
Theories of relational autonomy have emerged as a challenge
to the classical formulation of individual autonomy as fundamentally
individualistic and rationalistic. These theories are premised on the
conviction that persons are socially embedded and that their
identities are formed within the context of social relationships
which shape their autonomy and their agency.3" Diana Meyers
developed such a theory in her study of traditional feminine
socialization.3" Meyers argues that traditional feminine socialization
can be a prime threat to personal autonomy because of its strongly
directive nature and because of the fact that it inititates women into
dependency and into placing the needs of others before their own."
Nevertheless, she points out that while many feminists regard
feminine oppression as crucial to the persistence of women's
subordination other feminists celebrate the ways in which the
feminine role has enabled women to develop unique ways to achieve
their goals.347 By analyzing the lives of traditional women, Meyers
develops an account of the ways in which autonomy is affected
343. See e.g., id. at 1147-48 (discussing the Supreme Court's stance on gender-based
classifications as an example of the way in which movement from traditional distinctions can
bring about cognitive dissonance).
344. Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, Introduction: Autonomy Refigured, in
RELATIONAL AUTONOMY, FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL
SELF 3,3 (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stolar eds. 2000).
345. Diana T. Meyers, Personal Autonomy and the Paradox of Feminine Socialization, 84
J. PHIL. 619 (1987). Meyers defines traditional feminine socialization as, "the set of practices
which instills in girls the gentle virtues of femininity along with homespun feminine goals".
Id. at 619.
346. Id. at 619, 621-24.
347. Id. at 620-21.
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by socialization.3 She argues that it is possible for people to act
autonomously in isolated situations and adopt some autonomous
projects and policies even though they have no control over the basic
direction of their lives. 9 Thus, while traditional women do not have
"global programmatic autonomy" which enables them to disregard
social expectations and pose and answer autonomously questions
on global issues (such as what line of work they want to pursue
or whether they want to have children), they do have "narrow
programmatic autonomy" which enables them to decide autonomously
on small scale issues.' Similarly, they might have "episodic
autonomy," which enables them to make autonomous decisions in
particular situations, as opposed to long term plans."' Finally, a
traditional woman might have partial access autonomy which
enables her to access and to give expression to some parts of her
self, while other parts of her self remain inaccessible to her due to
her socialization. 2
In order to explain how people are able to exercise the three
lesser forms of autonomy without being able to exercise full
autonomy, Meyers develops the notion of "autonomy competency.""
She posits that personal autonomy "can only be achieved through
the exercise of a repertory of coordinated skills, which constitutes
autonomy competency. People are prevented from extending their
autonomy to global programmatic decisions when they lack
proficiency in one or more of these skills or when these skills are ill-
coordinated. " "4 As examples of those skills Meyers identifies: the
ability to "vividly envisage different life plans and seriously
entertain them," the ability to "assess the practicality of the
options," the ability to "resist the unwarranted demands of other
individuals along with conformist societal pressures," and the
348. Id. at 621-24.
349. Id. at 624.
350. Id. at 624-25.
351. Id. at 625. Meyers provides an example of episodic autonomy involving a traditional
woman who "summons the courage to demand that her child's teacher show respect for values
that she cherishes." Id.
352. Id. at 625-26. Here Meyers uses the same confrontation between the woman and the
teacher in which the woman, being born and raised as a Christian Fundamentalist and never
having questioned her faith, demands that the teacher teach her child creationism and not
evolution and succeeds in conveying the outrage that she genuinely feels. Id. Although the
woman does not have the measure of access to her self required to question her faith, she does
have the measure of access needed to feel and convey effectively her outrage at her perceived
notions of disrespect shown to her faith. Id.
353. Id. at 626-628.
354. Id. at 627.
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resolve to carry out their plans. 5 Meyers concludes that because
traditional feminine socialization curtails the development of
autonomy competency, the traditional woman can primarily exercise
only the lesser forms of autonomy.
356
Applying this account of autonomy to questions of consent and
exit, it is easy to see why it would be difficult for traditional women
whose autonomy competency is underdeveloped to withhold their
consent to the discriminatory practices that are at the core of their
socialization or to exit the community in which they have been
socialized. Withholding of consent to discriminatory practices and
exercising the right of exit require total disregard to social
expectations and the ability to pose and answer global questions
regarding one's long term life plan. According to Meyer's account,
both of these are skills that are not within the autonomy
competency of most traditional women.
Theorists of relational autonomy have discussed additional
conditions that are necessary for the development of autonomy
competency and the full exercise of autonomy. Paul Benson argues
that a sense of self worth is a necessary condition for the exercise of
free agency.5 7 According to Benson "the sense of worthiness to act
which is necessary for free agency involves regarding oneself as
being competent to answer for one's conduct in light of normative
demands that, from one's point of view, others might appropriately
apply to one's actions."35 Benson suggests that an individual's sense
of competence to answer for her own conduct can vary depending on
the normative domain in relation to which she assesses her
competence.5 9 Thus, an agent's ability to act freely is crucially
dependant upon her social interactions and on the reactions she gets
or anticipates getting from other people in response.3 ° When a
woman's social interaction within her community leads her to
believe that she would not be competent to answer for her conduct
if she tried to resist discriminatory practices or to exit her
community, then, according to Benson's analysis, her failure to do
so cannot be regarded as a product of her own free will.3
6 1
355. Id.
356. Id. at 627-628.
357. Paul Benson, Free Agency and Self-Worth, 91 J. PHIL. 650 (1994).
358. Id. at 660.
359. Id. at 662.
360. Id. at 659-61.
361. Id.
2004] 521
522 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 10:459
A condition for autonomy related to that of self-worth is self-trust.
6 2
Mcleod and Sherwin argue that "an agent requires a certain degree
of self trust to be able to act autonomously," and that "because
oppression undermines self-trust, it reduces an agent's ability to act
autonomously.3" "Oppression can lead to the internalization of a
sense of social worthlessness and incompetence that is translated into
a lack of self-worth and self-trust."' In order to act autonomously, an
agent must trust her own judgments, her ability to make choices,
and her capacity to make decisions and to act on them.315 Without
trust in her ability to do all these things, an agent will have little
motivation to even attempt to act autonomously."' As with self-
worth, self-trust is dependent on the reaction of the agent's social
environment to her actions."' Thus, oppressive ideologies that
undermine a woman's self-trust in her capacity to challenge
community norms or to survive outside the community would also
undermine her capacity to act autonomously on these issues.
Finally, the theory that posits the most comprehensive link
between autonomy and society is that of the "social construction" of
the person.3 The idea of social construction is that the personal and
institutional social relationships within which we live shape our
desires, preferences, beliefs, values and even the way we define
reality.369 We can only understand our desires, preferences, beliefs
and values by placing them in their historical, social and political
contexts, because these contexts are what makes meaning possible,
and meaning creates "reality".37 0 However, the context in which we
all live is one of "patriarchy, sexism and male privilege."37' The
"rules and norms of patriarchy are not simply external restrictions
on women's otherwise natural desires; rather, they create an entire
cultural context that makes women seem to choose what they are in
362. Carolyn Mcleod & Susan Sherwin, Relational Autonomy, Self-Trust, and Health Care
For Patients who are Oppressed, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUrTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE
SoCiAL SELF 259 (Catriona McKenzie and Natalie Stoijar eds. 2000). Mcleod and Sherwin
posit that self trust, self worth and self respect are distinct yet mutually reinforcing self
regarding attitudes. Id. at 266.
363. Id. at 261.
364. Id. at 262.
365. Id. at 262-63.
366. Id. at 263.
367. Id. at 265.
368. NANCY J. HIRSCHMANN, THE SUBJECT OF LIBERTY: TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF
FREEDOM 10 (2003).
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
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fact restricted to."3 7 2 While theories of adaptive preferences and
oppressive socialization seem to suggest that by removing these
oppressive conditions it is possible to uncover the essential and
natural self which exists prior to these conditions, social
constructivism suggests that the self is produced through social
formations and does not exist outside of them.373 Thus, the social
context within which a woman lives simultaneously creates both her
oppression and her agency.37 While this means that even the most
oppressive settings empower women, it also means that the
restrictions created by oppressive settings on women's agency
operate on a much deeper and more constitutive level than other
theories of autonomy seem to suggest. Consequently, if the identity
and the agency of women living in traditional communities are
socially constructed by the extremely patriarchal and oppressive
social context within which they live, which dictates their
submissive and unquestioning acceptance of discriminatory
community norms, it is clear why most of these women would not
object to such norms nor try to exit the community.
C. Democracy and Women's Agency
The feminist theories of autonomy discussed above suggest that
women's agency under patriarchy should be understood as
incomplete or partial.375 Women's choices are "neither fully free nor
completely determined," and are shaped in significant ways by the
patriarchal and sexist culture in which they live.376 While the
choices of all individuals are shaped by culture and thus no
individual, neither man nor woman, enjoys complete agency, the
problem for women, as well as other oppressed groups, is that their
choices are shaped by a culture that oppresses them and
consequently their choices serve to perpetuate their own
oppression. 3" This oppression is both reflected in the political
process and is also perpetuated by it because political processes
define preferences just as preferences define political processes.378
For example, in her analysis of the Virginia Military Institute
372. Id. at 11.
373. Id. at 12.
374. Id. at 13.
375. Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Red ux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 306 (1995) (suggesting that women have "partial agency"). Higgins,
supra note 238, at 1691 (suggesting that women have "incomplete agency").
376. Higgins, supra note 238, at 1691.
377. Id. at 1696-98 (arguing that social forces influence the choices a woman makes).
378. hU at 1700.
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decision, 3' 9 Higgins argues that the mere fact of the existence of an
all male military school for generations has affected the preferences
of citizens, both men and women, as to its continued existence." °
This claim is compatible with the theory of adaptive preferences
discussed above, which suggests that inequality perpetuates itself
by creating a taste for inequality.3 81 Hence, under conditions of
inequality, the democratic process only serves to reflect and
perpetuate this inequality and cannot in itself correct it.
The fact that women under patriarchy are neither fully free nor
fully equal threatens the legitimacy of the democratic process
because democratic legitimacy is based on the consent of free and
equal persons.3 2 Because many of the practices and norms that
create and perpetuate women's inequality and limited freedom
originate in the private sphere, full equality and freedom for women
can only be achieved through state intervention aimed
at eradicating such norms and practices, in both the private and
public spheres."s As a result, democratic legitimacy becomes
dependent on such state intervention in the private sphere. 4 This
observation is true both with regard to intervention in civil society
institutions in general and with regard to intervention in illiberal
communities, both religious and non-religious, in particular. Thus,
if the members of the illiberal community are a part of the liberal
democratic society and participate in the democratic process, then
the inequality inherent in the illiberal community affects the
political choices of its members and through them, the political
choices of society as a whole. The illegitimacy of the democratic
process increases in direct relation to the increase in number and
influence of citizens who are members of illiberal communities or
associations and who utilize the democratic process to perpetuate
and entrench inequality.'
379. United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that Virginia could not
continue to maintain VMI as an all male publicly supported university, VMI was required to
either admit women or become a private institution).
380. Higgins, supra note 238, at 1668.
381. Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3,8-9, (1991) (arguing
that preferences are shaped by the existing situation and by the legal rules governing it).
382. CAROLE PATEMAN, THE DISORDER OF WOMEN: DEMOCRACY, FEMINISM AND POLITICAL
THEORY, 72 (1989) ("Women exemplify the individuals whom consent theorists have declared
to be incapable of consenting."); Higgins, supra note 238, at 1665.
383. Higgins, supra note 238, at 1698.
384. 1&
385. This would suggest that the state has no legitimate interest in intervening in small
secluded communities that abstain from part-icipation in the democratic process. However,
while the analysis in this section might not apply to such communities, the state still has an
interest in intervening in them due to the interests of women and girls in these communities.
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A prime example is a country such as Israel, where religious
political parties are a significant force in the parliament and where
the ultra-Orthodox Jews, both men and women, vote en masse for
these all male parties, which have unequivocal objections to
women's right to equality.' A similar phenomenon is equally
evident in the United States where, despite the separation between
religion and the state, conservative religious groups who
strenuously object to women's right to equality use their political
power and the democratic process to turn their objection into
national policy."8 7 While these political phenomena seem natural
and inevitable in a pluralist society, and while they are merely an
extreme example of the inequality that exists in society as a whole,
they demonstrate the link between the private sphere and the
public sphere as epitomized in the democratic elections process.
They also explain why separation between religion and the state
cannot in itself serve to ensure women's right to equality and why
the ever-expanding right to free exercise of (allegedly) private
discrimination is in fact an acutely public matter. The Boy Scouts
case is another good example of the inseparable link between the
public and the private sphere.3 The United States Supreme Court
held that as a private expressive association the Boy Scouts of
America are free to discriminate against homosexuals and to
advocate that homosexuals are not sufficiently "morally straight" to
be Boy Scouts.s 9 The court held this despite the fact that the Boy
Scouts of America is an association that has had more than eighty
seven million members over its existence,"0 many of whom were
impressionable children who were much less likely to analyze
critically the exclusionary message against homosexuals that is now
explicit in the Boy Scouts teachings. It is difficult to dismiss the
effects that the exclusionary teachings of an organization as large
and influential as the Boy Scouts of America will have on the battle
See supra Parts V(A), V(B) and infra Section V(D).
386. The political force of the objection to equality for women is well demonstrated by the
fact that the most important reason why the right to equality was not incorporated in the two
Basic Laws on human rights enacted in 1992 was the objection of the ultra-Orthodox and
Orthodox religious parties to its inclusion. The parties' objection was motivated mainly by
their concern that guaranteeing the right to equality in a Basic Law would invalidate the
discriminatory religious family laws. Yehudit Karp, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty
- A Biography of Power Struggles, 1 MISHPAT U MhIMsAL 323, 341-43 (1992) (Hebrew).
387. The defeat of ERA provides an example of this. See supra notes 124-126 and
accompanying text. The abortion issue is another example.
388. Boy Scouts v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
389. Id. at 650.
390. Id. at 697 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the
public sphere s9'
D. Education and the Right to Know that You are Equal
The coercion exercised by religious communities towards
weaker members such as women becomes more evident upon
examination of the way that such communities educate their
children. As philosopher Elizabeth Minnich argues".. .education is
of critical importance. It is in and through education that a culture,
and polity, not only tries to perpetuate but enacts the kinds of
thinking it welcomes, and discards and/or discredits the kinds it
fears." 92 Religious education enshrining women's subordinate
status plays a crucial role in perpetuating discrimination against
women by instilling in both men and women the belief in the
sanctity of this subordination and by psychologically disarming
women's resistance to it. Research presented by Dwyer shows that
female students in Christian Fundamentalist and Catholic schools
in the United States are taught "that they are by virtue of their
gender, inferior human beings. " "
Fundamentalist schools deliberately and systematically inculcate
in their students the belief that females are inferior to males,
that a woman's only purpose in life is to serve a husband
and raise children, and that only men should pursue careers
outside the home, become active in public affairs and leaders of
their community, or even assert opinions about matters beyond
home life. To think otherwise is sinful: 'sexual equality denies
God's word.'"94
Similarly, female students in Catholic schools "... received
explicit and implicit messages that boys were superior, that girls
were not expected to succeed academically, that it was unladylike
to be assertive, and that a woman's proper role in life was one of
domestic subservience.""' There are approximately four million
pupils in Catholic and Christian Fundamentalist religious schools
in the United States."g Thus, around two million girls who are
members of religious communities that they did not freely choose
391. Id. Justice Stevens refers to the Boy Scouts as an organization with "enornous prestige."
392. ELIZABEm MINNICH, TRANSFORMING KNOWLEDGE 5 (1990).
393. JAMEs G. DwYEP, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHInDREN's RIGHTS 39 (1998).
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 16.
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also attend schools, which they did not freely choose, and which
inculcate in them the belief that God ordained them to be men's
submissive subordinates.
Children have neither the legal or the actual capacity to make
informed choices about matters such as the kind of education that
they need unless they reach a certain age and have received an
education enabling them to develop the necessary capacities. 39
Thus, if the voluntary nature of religious association is what
justifies government non-intervention, then no such justification
applies to religious education due to its patently non-voluntary
nature. Further, it is a misconception that communities have any
rights regarding the education of the children of community
members.398 Rather, the parents and the state share the right to
decide the form and content of the education a child will receive.399
As long as the parents' decisions are in the best interests of the
child, the parents may choose for the child. Because the interests of
parent and child are distinguishable, when parents do not act in the
best interests of the child, the state is entitled to intervene., °°
Do parents who teach their daughters that they are inferior by
reason of their sex act within the best interests of their daughters?
A person's right to know that she is equal forms the core of the right
to equality and is a prerequisite for developing the self-trust, self-
worth and self respect necessary to function as an autonomous
person. Dwyer argues that "the 'inestimable toll' of sexist
instruction on the 'social, economic, intellectual, and psychological
well-being' of girls.. .is undeniable given the crucial role that self
esteem plays in child development and education." 1 In this respect
teaching a female child that she is not equal is more fundamentally
wrong than teaching her that other people are unequal because of
their race, religion or sex. Although any inculcation of ideas
advocating discrimination is harmful to society, only the inculcation
of a child's own inferiority can have such a profoundly debilitating
impact on her life. "2
397. BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY, 200 (2001); Amy Gutmann, Children,
Paternalism, and Education: A Liberal Argument, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 338 (1980)(arguing for
a liberal principle of paternalism which takes into account the child's potential as a rational
self-governing individual).
398. BARRY, supra note 397, at 205-207.
399. Id. at 202.
400. Id.
401. DWYER, supra note 393, at 134-35.
402. While state intervention aimed at ensuring that children are educated to believe in
their own equality can be justified both on grounds of the best interests of children and on
grounds of the best interests of society, state intervention aimed at ensuring that children are
educated to believe in the equality of others can only be justified on the latter grounds.
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Furthermore, as discussed in Part V(C), the oppression to which
women and girls are exposed in illiberal communities undermines
their ability to function as free and equal citizens and threatens the
legitimacy of the democratic process."° Thus, the interests of the
child and the state in state intervention ensuring education for
equality coincide.' Amy Gutmann posits that state regulation of
both public and private schools in a liberal democracy is justified,
despite its adverse effects on the parents' rights of religion, to the
extent that the regulation attempts to guarantee the child's right to
receive "an education adequate to full and equal citizenship."4°5 In
a similar vein, Linda McClain suggests that with respect to
government intervention in the family "[w]hen practices of sex
inequality within families affect children in ways that pose harm to
them by significantly impairing the development of their capacities
for personal and democratic self-government, government would
have a strong interest in preventing or ameliorating those
practices.' ° Educating girls to believe in their own inferiority
inadequatly guarantees their full and equal citizenship. Such
education is aimed at ensuring that these girls will enjoy only a
subsidiary citizenship to that of their husbands.
It has been suggested that the purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause is not only to protect citizens from state power but also to
protect citizens from private power."O7 Robin West argues that the
Fourteenth Amendment was passed only after it became apparent
that it was required in order to compel the states to protect the freed
slaves from private violence by whites and to guarantee freed slaves
the legal rights of contract and property without which they could
not be protected against violation of their economic rights by
whites. °8 West posits that the amendment was intended to prevent
a state of "dual sovereignty" and to ensure that "[n]o citizen shall be
subject to uncheckable violence by anyone other than the state; no
citizen shall be under the will and command of anyone other than
403. A related problem of democratic legitimacy is created by the tendency in some
fundamentalist religious groups to require their members to vote according to the dictates of
the group leaders instead of exercising their independent judgment. See Gavison, supra note
143, at 235-36.
404. See BARRY supra, note 397, at 209 (arguing that state intervention in children's
education is justified both on grounds of the public interest in the education of citizens and
on grounds of the need to ensure the best interests of the children).
405. Gutmann, supra note 397, at 351.
406. Linda C. McClain, The Domain of Civic Virtue in a Good Society: Families, Schools,
and Sex Equality, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1617, 1649 (2001).
407. ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDmNT 24 (1994).
408. Id. at 25.
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the state."" 9 The state violates the guarantee of equal protection if
it does not deter its citizens from using credible threats of violence
against other citizens in order to create a relationship of sovereignty
between a subject and a master." ° In the modern context, West
explains, the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to protect
citizens from subjection to situations of private subordination that
are analogous to slavery."'
The education girls receive in fundamentalist and Catholic
religious schools, as described above, coupled with the subordinating
indoctrination they receive within their families and communities,
is an instance of private subordination similar to those described by
West as analogous to slavery. Therefore, it justifies state
intervention to protect girls from its adverse consequences. Susan
Okin argues that in fundamentalist and orthodox religious
communities the powers of family and religion combine to instill in
children the idea of the subordination of women in a way that
circumvents the ability of girls to become free and equal citizens."2
The purpose behind educating girls to believe in their own
inferiority and naturally subordinate state is to create a situation
in which they would be subject to the private power of their
husbands as adult women. In fact, in both Christian and Jewish
religions the sovereignty of man over woman is equated to the
sovereignty of God over man."3 Through the use of constant coercive
power, both mental and physical,"' girls are led to believe that
subordination to the dictates of their husbands and the norms of
their community is their natural duty, and that they cannot and
should not resist it."15
Obviously, the strongest case for including mandatory
education for equality between the sexes as a way of countering the
409. Id. at 23.
410. Id. at 23-24.
411. Id. at 26. West provides the marital rape exemption and the incessant refusal of some
police officers to enter neighborhoods with high crime rates as examples of modern situations
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect. Id. at 32-33.
412. Susan Moiler Okdn, Political Liberalism, Justice and Gender, 105 ETHICS 23, 32 (1994).
413. Kathleen A. McDonald, Battered Wives, Religion & Law: An Interdisciplinary
Approach, 2 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 251, 265 (1990).
414. DWYER, supra note 393, at 21-22 (noting that "fundamentalist educators uniformly
support corporal punishment" based on biblical proverbs and instruct parents to use it).
415. Kathleen A. McDonald notes that Christian teachings are often used to support the
institutionalized male domination of women:
Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the lord. For the
husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the church; and he
is the savior of the body. Therefore as the church is subject unto Christ, so let
the wives be to their own husbands in everything.
McDonald, supra note 413, at 274 (quoting Ephesians 5:22-24).
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sexist education children are liable to receive at home can be made
with regard to public schools.416 However, while such education can
help to counteract some of the effects of the sexism prevalent in
society in general, it will not reach many children in fundamentalist
religious communities who are sent to private religious schools and
who are exposed to highly sexist and oppressive teachings. One can
expect that following the Supreme Court decision in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris,41 and unless immediate measures are taken, this
problem will exacerbate considerably as new opportunities are
created for families to send their children to sexist religious schools
funded by the state through voucher programs. Consequently, it is
imperative that the expanding use of vouchers be utilized by the
state as a means to introduce mandatory education for equality
between the sexes into private religious schools. The decision in
Zelman affirms that the state is entitled to impose conditions on
voucher providers, including conditions as to the content of their
teaching, such as a prohibition on the teaching of "hatred of any
person or group on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or
religion."418 Similarly, voucher programs should include provisions
mandating education for equality between the sexes. Obviously, it
is no accident that the above quoted provision from the Ohio
voucher program does not include a ban on the teaching of hatred
on the basis of sex. This omission demonstrates well this article's
claim that women's right to equality is the major casualty of the
newly expanded and partially state financed right to free exercise
of discrimination. There is no justification in law or in political
theory for this disregard for women's right to equality, and it should
be corrected promptly.
However, while mandating the teaching of sex equality in
schools participating in voucher programs might expose some of the
children in private religious schools to sex equality, it is only
through the expansion of the duty to teach sex equality to all
accredited schools that many of the girls most vulnerable to
oppression by the combined sexist powers of family, religion, and
community can be reached. The constitutional case for imposing
limitations on religious schools' freedom to teach the subordination
of women is similar whether the benefit conferred on the school by
416. See, e.g., McClain, supra note 406, at 69 (noting that the original purpose of public
schooling was an attempt to gather students from diverse backgrounds and shape them into
unified citizens, and arguing that education impacts a child's preparation for citizenship and
her overall success in life).
417. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2001).
418. Id. at 2463 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.976 (aX6)).
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the state is voucher program money or accreditation.419 Thus, the
states should use their power of accreditation in order to ensure
that all girls, and especially those girls living in the most oppressive
communities, get the opportunity to learn that they are equal.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article explored the relationship between religion,
community, and the state and its effects on women's right to equality.
Examining this relationship in both the United States and Israel,
I argue that a regime of separation between religion and the state
such as the one that exists in the United States can exhibit many of
the shortcomings of a regime of partial integration between religion
and the state such as the one that exists in Israel, if aimed to
support religion rather than curbing its discriminatory norms.
Women's right to equality is further compromised by the expansion
of the exemption given to religious associations from equality
obligations to other civil society institutions, as well as by the
unprecedented flow of government funds to religious institutions,
which is not accompanied by prohibitions on discrimination
against women.
Using Articles 2 and 5 of CEDAW, I demonstrated how both the
United States and Israel fall far short of the standard set by
CEDAW, which requires the state parties to the convention to take
all necessary measures, in both the public and the private spheres,
to create the necessary conditions for the achievement of equality
for women, by actively striving to modify all existing cultural,
religious, and other norms that discriminate against women.
Similar to religion in Israel, the United States Constitution, with its
emphasis on negative liberties and First Amendment rights, is used
to justify the obstruction of women's right to equality in the name
of religious and communal freedoms. Concerns for the rights of
associations and communities to determine their boundaries and
their internal norms, coupled with a commitment to government
non-intervention in the private sphere, operate to exclude anti-
discrimination laws from an ever wider range of human activities,
thereby establishing a new right to free exercise of discrimination.
I argue that this right is incompatible with the importance of
equality in American constitutional law and contradicts the recent
419. Zelman's Future, supra note 63, at 976-977. On the constitutionality of mandating
education for equality of the sexes in religious schools see also James G. Dwyer, The Children
We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare and Education Laws as Denials of Equal
Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1321 (1996).
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emphasis on equality in First Amendment jurisprudence. I therefore
suggest that the right of both religious and non-religious associations
to discriminate on bases such as sex and race should be restricted
to situations of intimate association.
Finally, this article shows that the right to free exercise of
discrimination is based on contradictory premises. While the
importance of personal beliefs, attachments, and values and their
near immutable nature serve to explain government's refusal to
intervene in constitutive communities in order to eliminate
discrimination, the alleged ability of women to object to
discriminatory community norms and to exit the community offers
a convenient substitute for the need for such intervention. However,
if constitutive communities are as important to people as this
formulation suggests, then they are no less important to women
than to men. Furthermore, I have demonstrated that the assumption
that women can easily resist their oppression or exit the community
is belied by the literature analyzing the myriad of ways in which
oppression hinders autonomy and the development of autonomy
competency, and argued that as a result, non-intervention in
religion and community threatens democratic legitimacy. Finally,
this article has claimed that in the particular case of children in
oppressive communities, there is not even a semblance of
voluntariness, and that therefore the state has a duty to ensure that
schools teach sex equality and that all girls are taught that they
are equal.
As Selya Benhabib explains, "All struggles against oppression
in the modern world begin by redefining what had previously been
considered private, non-public, and non-political issues as matters
of public concern, as issues of justice, as sites of power that need
discursive legitimation."2 0 It is time to recognize that religion and
community are sites of extensive power which currently serve as a
shield for patriarchy and oppression, and that it is impossible to
ensure equality, particularly equality for women, without subjecting
these sites of power to equality obligations and putting an end to the
free exercise of discrimination.
420. Seyla Benhabib, Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition, and
Jurgen Habermas, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 73, 84 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992).
